Comment by brundolf
4 years ago
I don't know about you, but hashes of the binaries I run don't exactly reveal any sensitive personal information about me. That said, obviously they should have much more graceful degradation in place for when something is wrong with the service.
The information reveals in exquisite detail what times of day I'm working, what times I'm slacking off, which days I work too.
And whether I'm taking a long or short lunch break, or lots of breaks. Whether I stay in bed until late, or work late at night. It's enough to predict whether I'm a "good" worker.
It also reveals whenever I travel, which coffee shops and libraries I frequent and what times of day. It also reveals what time I open any of several video conferencing apps.
And the sort of thing some HR would like to browse when assessing job candidates. They wouldn't need to ask "do you know X", they could just consult the Apple log of how often I run the relevant commands. Things like "we see you ran 'git' an average of 145 times per day last month, tell us more about that".
And whether I'm running tools I "shouldn't".
All that seems quite sensitive and personal to me.
> It's enough to predict whether I'm a "good" worker.
If your employer is willing to be that invasive, they already have a much easier route for getting that information: forcibly installing surveillance software on your work machine.
> It also reveals whenever I travel, which coffee shops and libraries I frequent and what times of day.
How...? How would the binaries you're running have anything remotely relevant to say about this?
> They wouldn't need to ask "do you know X", they could just consult the Apple log of how often I run the relevant commands. Things like "we see you ran 'git' an average of 145 times per day last month, tell us more about that".
That's a pretty contrived use-case for a pretty significant and unscrupulous bit of data-sharing. From a PR perspective Apple would never intentionally and publicly share this data. So assuming this data is even stored anywhere after the check is complete, and assuming any personal identification is kept with it, both of which are huge ifs, that leaves a couple of possibilities:
- Hackers gain access to the data
- Government subpoenas the data
- Extremely lucrative contracts, probably from advertising companies, are enough to motivate Apple to sell the data despite the risk of a massive PR scandal
I don't see any of those falling under your proposed scenario of random employers casually perusing the logs.
> If your employer is willing to be that invasive, they already have a much easier route for getting that information: forcibly installing surveillance software on your work machine.
The question was whether the information gathered is personal and sensitive.
The fact there is another way it could be gathered doesn't make the information less personal or sensitive.
> How...? How would the binaries you're running have anything remotely relevant to say about this?
Because your temporary IP address is part of the hash request, and that's usually enough to identify which major organisation's network you are on, not counting any geolocation.
Thus, coffee shop (which brand), library (government network), home or mobile, at least.
I expect the websites and services I'm using to have this when I'm using them. That's reasonable, I'm reaching out to them.
Apple itself is not a service I'm using constantly, so I don't expect it to be sent a minute-by-minute update of my movements whenever I'm doing work in a CLI, and happen to have wifi on.
(I don't use iCloud, btw. Perhaps people using iCloud expect activity to be streamed constantly.)
> From a PR perspective Apple would never intentionally and publicly share this data.
Again, the question was whether the information is personal and sensitive. That's a property of the information itself.
Not whether Apple intends to store it and share it.
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"Hey Siri, select every Tor Browser user in America for additional screening."
Ironically, if tor was already running, the check would run over tor and not be traceable. But to start it in the first place it would be traceable. Damn.
The connection would run over tor, but the app you're running and any other PII could/would still be sent regardless.
That's scary. What if you set it up inside a Virtual Machine?
In this case, isn't the hash of the binary consistent across all devices, so Apples can in fact derive exactly which binary you're running (assuming they have a large database of application binary and hashes)?
> assuming they have a large database of application binary and hashes
A database like an "app store"?
yup! and the variety of ways to leak that information along the way...Privacy(tm)!
Yes. My personal data involves what I do within those apps, not which ones they are.
That's not even close to true. Apps that you have downloaded can reveal a massive amount of potentially personal information.
Think about someone having a dating app that would out them. Or a therapy app that they don't want people to know about. And that just scratches the surface.
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I don't think that's necessarily true. Meta data about your usage can be very revealing in itself. To use an analogy, if someone tracked every location you visited that'd be very invasive, regardless of whether they recorded any details about what you did at those locations.
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Its what apps you’ve got, exactly when and how often you use them, and where you are at those times via network info. Casual gay pickup app, last night in a coffee shop in the red light district, while your wife thought you were at the office working late for example.
I run Tor browser occasionally. That fact alone is sensitive personal information about me. It makes me stand out. Someday it might be held against me.
I already expect the ISP to detect my Tor traffic.
But I didn't expect Apple, of all companies, to have a detailed audit trail of every time I've ever opened it, to the nearest minute.
Don’t forget that client IP geolocation gives coarse location, so they have your timestamped track log, too.
Big Sur prevents Little Snitch from blocking these system level connections, and these OS apps will also bypass any configured VPN.
What about the hash of a password cracking binary or the hash of some sort of binary used for piracy or stripping DRM off of something? Or just in general the ability to profile users based on the apps they use seems completely trivial. I imagine it would not take a particularly brilliant data scientist to correlate people who use FTP programs or developer programs or whatever else with people who buy high value items from certain e-commerce sites, for example. Seems like a marketer’s dream if they could ever get access to that. And sure Apple wouldn’t do that, today, on purpose, but are you 100% certain that could never happen? And if there was some way to tie that illegal piracy app binary hash to you personally and the government came knocking with a subpoena, seems like something Apple might be forced to comply with. It’s a very slippery slope.
> I don't know about you, but hashes of the binaries I run don't exactly reveal any sensitive personal information about me.
If they know the hash of (let's say) a pr0n app which you run, then I'd say that's pretty damn sensitive information Apple is getting.
It reveals how often I am running new software, it reveals what time of day I run new software, it reveals what networks I connect from
I think that for some users, the applications they run and the frequency they run them at would be enough to identify them across time and accounts. I could change my identifier, even my name, but at the end of the day, I've been using the same apps for at least a decade more or less.