Comment by bcrl
5 years ago
The motivation was not perceived cost benefits, but actual costs of their customers. Retraining pilots and qualifying them would have meant new operational costs for airlines operating the 737 Max negating the benefit of the more efficient bigger engines. That pushed Boeing to try to make the Max series fly "like" a regular 737. Problem is that they couldn't hide the fact that crappy software written by $7/hour coders is a poor substitute for an airframe scaled up to match the bigger engine size. Deaths were inevitable when they decided to lie to the pilots about what was actually going on. Done correctly, the software fix could have been workable, but the design of MCAS was piss poor.
The cost of retraining the pilots was something that's been shouldered dozens of times in the past. I'd imagine that an Engineering CEO making a bold bet that software could avoid the retraining need would have been both more ambitious and smarter about the change. Why not build the right airframe and give the plane flight modes to emulate the characteristics of various 7xx aircraft that pilots were familiar with?
Good point. I'm truly curious how far up the chain that decision went. Knowing how software gets written, I'd be willing to bet there were quite a few informal discussions about the various trade offs of the possible approaches taken to meet the design requirements.