TL;DR, it was becoming apparent that Japan was not going to surrender, and were willing to fight to the last man standing. The nuclear bomb drops were to demonstrate to the Japanese government that they were clearly outmatched by the end of the war.
It was to create the impression there was an indefinite supply of bombs, but to who?
I believe there is an opinion of some that part of the motivation was to prevent the Soviet Union from moving in after Japan's defeat, like they did in Europe.
This is often asserted as if it were a shocking revelation and a moral indictment of the decision.
However, it seems to me both a plausible motivation (I haven't bothered to read up on the evidence or don't remember if I have) and potentially morally defensible, particularly in hindsight.
That's the popular narrative, yes. I've seldom heard a historian endorse it. Rather, the evidence suggests that the surrender was primarily triggered by the Soviet Union's declaration of war.
Note that it's in the interests of both countries to promote the Bomb narrative - America to justify the financial and moral cost, and Japan to justify the loss of the war (a black-swan wonder-weapon being a less shameful reason for defeat than military incompetence). But in truth, Japan's cities had already been firebombed to smithereens - in that context the Bomb wasn't really all that shocking.
There was no need to burn two cities. The head honchos could have been taken to the test(s); with the possibility of surrendering earlier with less territory lost to Soviets.
If you think the US only burned two Japanese cities, you should look at the history of the US's bombing campaign. Firebombs were used a lot.
As for "taking the head honchos to the tests", let me propose a few counterfactuals:
1. Japanese leadership sees bomb, changes air defense priorities to target small groups of planes and not mass attacks. Enola Gay is shot down. Invasion happens starting in October; 500k+ die at minimum.
2. Japanese leadership thinks the US is soft and lacks will to victory, holds out even after bombs are dropped. Invasion happens starting in October; 500k+ die at minimum.
3. Japanese realize this isn't really worse than the existing mass firebombs, distributes more production and population away from cities. Invasion happens starting in October; 500k+ die at minimum.
Considering how close the surrender seems to have been in our timeline (personal decision of the Emperor, overriding advisors and military leadership) I would not assume that a softer path would work.
The reasoning I have heard is that USA wanted to show it just wasn't a one-off or all-or-nothing attempt. By showing they could do this multiple times, it was a more effective weapon.
That's precisely what they were.
TL;DR, it was becoming apparent that Japan was not going to surrender, and were willing to fight to the last man standing. The nuclear bomb drops were to demonstrate to the Japanese government that they were clearly outmatched by the end of the war.
It worked.
It was to create the impression there was an indefinite supply of bombs, but to who?
I believe there is an opinion of some that part of the motivation was to prevent the Soviet Union from moving in after Japan's defeat, like they did in Europe.
This is often asserted as if it were a shocking revelation and a moral indictment of the decision.
However, it seems to me both a plausible motivation (I haven't bothered to read up on the evidence or don't remember if I have) and potentially morally defensible, particularly in hindsight.
That's the popular narrative, yes. I've seldom heard a historian endorse it. Rather, the evidence suggests that the surrender was primarily triggered by the Soviet Union's declaration of war.
https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/05/30/the-bomb-didnt-beat-jap...
Note that it's in the interests of both countries to promote the Bomb narrative - America to justify the financial and moral cost, and Japan to justify the loss of the war (a black-swan wonder-weapon being a less shameful reason for defeat than military incompetence). But in truth, Japan's cities had already been firebombed to smithereens - in that context the Bomb wasn't really all that shocking.
There was no need to burn two cities. The head honchos could have been taken to the test(s); with the possibility of surrendering earlier with less territory lost to Soviets.
> There was no need to burn two cities.
If you think the US only burned two Japanese cities, you should look at the history of the US's bombing campaign. Firebombs were used a lot.
As for "taking the head honchos to the tests", let me propose a few counterfactuals:
1. Japanese leadership sees bomb, changes air defense priorities to target small groups of planes and not mass attacks. Enola Gay is shot down. Invasion happens starting in October; 500k+ die at minimum.
2. Japanese leadership thinks the US is soft and lacks will to victory, holds out even after bombs are dropped. Invasion happens starting in October; 500k+ die at minimum.
3. Japanese realize this isn't really worse than the existing mass firebombs, distributes more production and population away from cities. Invasion happens starting in October; 500k+ die at minimum.
Considering how close the surrender seems to have been in our timeline (personal decision of the Emperor, overriding advisors and military leadership) I would not assume that a softer path would work.
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The reasoning I have heard is that USA wanted to show it just wasn't a one-off or all-or-nothing attempt. By showing they could do this multiple times, it was a more effective weapon.
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Actually they had already lost the war on the chinese front and would have surrendered anyway...