Comment by tialaramex

That's true. Yubico provide a way to just pick a new random number. Because these are typically just AES keys, just "picking a random number" is good enough, it's not going to "pick wrong".

If you worry about this attack you definitely should perform a reset after purchasing the device. This is labelled "reset" because it invalidates all your credentials, the credentials you enrolled depend on that secret, and so if you pick a random new secret obviously those credentials stop working. So, it won't make sense to do this randomly while owning it, but doing it once when you buy the device can't hurt anything.

However, although I agree it would be possible for an adversary who makes keys to just remember all the factory set secrets inside them, I will note an important practical difference from RSA SecurID:

For SecurID those are actually shared secrets. It's morally equivalent to TOTP. To authenticate you, the other party needs to know the secret which is baked inside your SecurID. So RSA's rationale was that if they remember the secret they can help their customers (the corporation that ordered 5000 SecurID dongles, I still have some laying around) when they invariably manage to lose their copy of that secret.

Whereas for a FIDO token, that secret is not shared. Each key needs a secret, but nobody else has a legitimate purpose for knowing it. So whereas RSA were arguably just foolish for keeping these keys, they had a reason - if you found out that say, Yubico kept the secrets that's a red flag, they have no reason to do that except malevolence.