← Back to context

Comment by tptacek

4 years ago

My contention, which is counterintuitive and very possibly wrong, but I feel strongly enough about it to defend it on a message board, is that exploits are so cheap that state-level actors are in fact not meaningfully price-sensitive to them.

It's true that you can't charge $2MM for a Firefox exploit right now. But that's because someone else is selling that exploit for an (orders of magnitude) lower price. So NSO can't just jack up exploit prices to soak the IC.

But if all exploit prices for a target are driven up, everywhere, my contention is that the IC will shrug and pay. That's because the value per dollar for exploits is extremely high compared to the other sources of intelligence the IC has, and will remain extremely high almost no matter how high you can realistically drive their prices. The fact is that for practically every government on the planet, the dollar figures we're talking about are not meaningful.

Ah, that is a novel and surprising take. Thanks!

Essentially exploits are sold massively under their "true value" and NSO doesn't get to capture this value because there are so many others giving them away for free.

It seems to me that a lot of exploits / PoCs are developed by security researchers doing it for the sport and making a name for themselves. This is probably part of the reason why exploits are so cheap. So then the question is, how much less productive will these researchers be if building exploits gets harder.

My feeling is that they will put in roughly the same amount of time. And hence their exploit production will probably drop proportionally to how much harder exploits are to find.