Comment by southerntofu
3 years ago
So the problem is our naming scheme is insecure so we ask untrustworthy 3rd-party entities to vet our certificates. The CA mafia isn't gonna give up their hard-earned monopoly easily (remember CACert?), and most client companies are happy to have for-profit CAs for insurance/policy compliance. Something like DNSSEC+DANE[0] is more reasonable but unfortunately unsupported by most programs.
No, the reasoning here is broken. Even with a secure naming scheme, you'd still need certificates, because you have to verify the authenticity of the secure channel you bring up (usually TLS), not just the security of the name. Any way you slice it, you end up with a third party vouching for your TLS certificate.
In the case of DNSSEC keys are distributed with the zone, so the trust anchor is the DNS root. Of course, your parent zone could lie about your keys (just like it could lie about your other records), but don't you think since DNS is already an attractive attack vector (as it can vouch for CAs to publish a trusted certificate), relying on it exclusively for certificate distribution would reduce the overall attack surface?
I'm not saying no trusted parties is the end goal (though Tor's onion or the GNU Name System work in this area), but maybe giving dozens of corporations/institutes the power to impersonate your server (from a client UX perspective) isn't the best we can do.
DNSSEC does the same thing (tradeoff: fewer corporations, but most of the important ones de jure controlled by governments, and no transparency logs†) --- you're just handing the CA role off to TLD operators.
To the extent DNS is an attractive attack vector, DNSSEC doesn't actually do much to mitigate those attacks. Most DNS corruption doesn't come from the on-the-wire cache corruption attacks DNSSEC was designed to address, but from attacks directly on registrars. There's nothing DNSSEC can do to mitigate those attacks, but not having CAs tied directly to DNS does mitigate them: it means the resultant misissued certificates are CT-logged.
If there was a huge difference in security from switching to DANE, this would be a different story. But in practice, the differences are marginal, and sometimes they're in the wrong direction.
Two really big things happened in the last decade that influenced the calculus here:
1. WebPKI certs are now reliably available free of charge, because of LetsEncrypt and the market pressures it created.
2. Chrome and Mozilla were unexpectedly successful at cleaning up the WebPKI, to the extent that some of the largest CAs were summarily executed for misissuance. That's not something people would have predicted in 2008! But WebPKI governance is now on its toes, in a way that DNS governance is unlikely ever to be.
(Cards on the table: I'd be a vocal opponent of DANE even if 1 & 2 weren't the case.)
† Not only is there no CT for DANE, but there's unlikely ever to be any --- CT was rolled out in the WebPKI under threat of delisting from Mozilla and Chrome's root cert programs, and that's not a threat you can make of DNS TLD operators.
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