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Comment by ryukafalz

4 years ago

> I really don't see what good that is when considered in the greater context of the Linux desktop paradigm, wherein any application running under your user almost certainly has write access to your entire $HOME, including the ability to tamper with your shell configuration, edit your $PATH, and do all manner of nasty subversive shit. To get any real security benefit from Wayland over X, you'd have to abandon the entire Linux desktop paradigm and use a completely new ecosystem as different from the traditional linux desktop as Android is.

It doesn’t require changes as deep as you’re implying (although I would say moving away from the traditional UNIX permissions model would ultimately be a good thing). It can be beneficial with existing application confinement mechanisms like Flatpak. You can restrict a Flatpak app from accessing your $HOME, but if it’s given access to your X server it has a lot more access than it likely needs. My understanding is the situation is better with Wayland, provided you only give it access to the Wayland socket and not the X11 socket.

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ryukafalz

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tannhaeuser  4 years ago

Why do Linux heads this needless containerization thing to themselves? There are zero new desktop apps coming; those in use are F/OSS and have been thoroughly reviewed for like 20 years. What's the threat? At best, it disturbs user file-based workflows and puts additional work onto developers who are few and far between anyway. Distros have worked well for a long time - much better than Win or Mac sw updates. If you want to compile your own app, it's well supported. We don't have a rush of new unstable must-have libs to compile against all of a sudden.

  • kaba0  4 years ago

    The problem is not trusting the application, but that application having to manage untrusted data. Let’s say you have a trusted open source pdf reader. It can easily be infected by a pdf that exploits a memory bug in it.