Comment by kfreds

2 years ago

> Ok, but... don't users have to reply [rely] on their provider’s pinky-promise that the two parties won't cooperate with each other and share their separate data, thereby connecting the dots? >

Yes. On the other hand, it does complicate things for the attacker, whether it is internal (the orgs) or external - a 3rd party attacker would have to compromise both orgs instead of one.

> After all, the two parties are already cooperating to an extent, so why can't they cooperate even more, either voluntarily or at the command of some hostile government?

Voluntarily: If you look at the business incentives that wouldn't make a lot of sense.

Forced by government: Here I'd say look at the jurisdictions of the orgs.

(disclosure: I'm one of the founders of Mullvad)

8 comments

kfreds

ignoramous 2 years ago

> Here I'd say look at the jurisdictions of the orgs.

Per Covert Surveillance Act passed in 2020, looks like Sweden (where Mullvad is based) can ask communication providers / website services to secretly add or assist with backdoors?

  ... Where the identity of the suspect is not known, but his contacts are known, or a third party (such as a website which the suspects visits) is known, one can permit secret data reading of these contacts, or the third party, but only in order to identify the suspect. Only (stored) historical metadata, not real-time data or communications and not by means of activation of audio or video surveillance functions can be used for this (section 4b).

https://www.venice.coe.int/files/Spyware/SWE-E.htm / https://archive.vn/LgE7a

kfreds 2 years ago
I'm pretty sure you're talking about this law, in which case it doesn't apply to us.
https://mullvad.net/en/help/swedish-covert-surveillance-data...
In short, "Mullvad is thus not covered by either the data storage provisions in the LEK for operations subject to a reporting obligation, or the duty to cooperate pursuant to the Covert Surveillance of Data Act."
- ignoramous 2 years ago
  
  > it doesn't apply to us
  This is also what your website says,
  But it could be interpreted contrarily - that VPN services through, for example, encryption via signals that the VPN service itself has power over through agreements with subcontractors, etc. could possibly be seen as an electronic communications service ...
  And I'm not just talking about Mullvad VPN (the "electronic communication service" provider), but Mullvad AB, which also hosts websites and builds apps (like the browser and VPN clients), too.
  So, is the "law doesn't apply" a fact? If so, may want to reword this bit on your website to make that much clear:
  [Mullvad's] opinion is that the reasonable interpretation is that a VPN service is not to be considered as an electronic communications service based on previous legislative history.
  If not, due to the "covert" nature of the Act, if Mullvad was coerced to co-operate with the govt, it seems Mullvad couldn't even publicly talk or hint about it (like warrant canaries, for example)?
  
  5 replies →