Not exactly. It generates the keys for you and stores them on device in the Secure Enclave. You cannot "bring your own" encryption key, but the primary benefit of doing so--that Apple does not have access to it--is intentionally accomplished anyway by the implementation.
I’m not sure I appreciate the value of literally bringing your own keys. My device generating them on my behalf as part of a setup process seems sufficient. You’d use openssl or something and defer to software to actually do keygen no matter what.
I agree it seems sort of academic at first blush, but I'm going to venture a guess it's the idea that you own them, instead of Apple.
So you can eg. keep a backup on your own (secure) infrastructure. Transfer them when switching devices or even mirror on two different ones*. Extract your own secret enclave contents. Improve confidence they were generated securely. And depending on implementation, perhaps reduce the ease with which Apple might "accidentally" vacuum the keys up as a result of an update / order.
*Not sure how much these two make sense in the iOS ecosystem. I know on the Android side I'd absolutely love to maintain a "hot standby" phone that is an exact duplicate of my daily driver, so if I drop it in the ocean I can be up and running again in a heartbeat with zero friction (without need to restore backups, reliance on nerfed backup API's outside the ones Google uses, having to re-setup 2FA, etc. and without ever touching Google's creepy-feeling cloud).
It depends what kind of backdoor the UK is asking for but "encryption backdoor" sounds like cryptographic compromise. I don't know if that's what it means but either way the only way to be sure your keys are secure is to generate them yourself.
Not exactly. It generates the keys for you and stores them on device in the Secure Enclave. You cannot "bring your own" encryption key, but the primary benefit of doing so--that Apple does not have access to it--is intentionally accomplished anyway by the implementation.
I’m not sure I appreciate the value of literally bringing your own keys. My device generating them on my behalf as part of a setup process seems sufficient. You’d use openssl or something and defer to software to actually do keygen no matter what.
I agree it seems sort of academic at first blush, but I'm going to venture a guess it's the idea that you own them, instead of Apple.
So you can eg. keep a backup on your own (secure) infrastructure. Transfer them when switching devices or even mirror on two different ones*. Extract your own secret enclave contents. Improve confidence they were generated securely. And depending on implementation, perhaps reduce the ease with which Apple might "accidentally" vacuum the keys up as a result of an update / order.
*Not sure how much these two make sense in the iOS ecosystem. I know on the Android side I'd absolutely love to maintain a "hot standby" phone that is an exact duplicate of my daily driver, so if I drop it in the ocean I can be up and running again in a heartbeat with zero friction (without need to restore backups, reliance on nerfed backup API's outside the ones Google uses, having to re-setup 2FA, etc. and without ever touching Google's creepy-feeling cloud).
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It depends what kind of backdoor the UK is asking for but "encryption backdoor" sounds like cryptographic compromise. I don't know if that's what it means but either way the only way to be sure your keys are secure is to generate them yourself.
1 reply →