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Comment by dathinab

7 hours ago

> I don’t believe other energy markets work very well either.

but is isn't even about that storm, big "oh no" situations happen sooner or later (e.g. see energy outage in Spain) what is important is that you learn from it.

but more important in this argument is the general design, how can it handle flexible loads, how can it share loads between areas, how many ways to handle partial failure does it has etc.

and Texas is kinda not that good in all of that AFIK

the problem is that there are markets where politics fully getting "out of the way", doesn't work as the market dynamics favor things which might be better for the people running the gird, but are bad on a state economical level anyway (but getting in the way here is using tax money to make sure the net is stable, not getting int the way of that to protect personal investments)

it's a bit like freighttrains in many parts of the EU, there operating does in most situation make no profit. But having them is helping the economy as a whole and can (implicitly) safe the state/region etc. money. So it makes sense to place some tax money into making them still viable to operate as that investment in a roundabout way saves more money then spend.

I agree that the ability to adapt, whether to flexible loads, partial failures, or cross-area balancing, is the real test of a grid design. Texas’s isolation means it inherently lacks some of the tools SPP or MISO can use, which makes resilience harder. That is not a “market” problem so much as a structural one. ERCOT’s ruleset was built to optimize for low-cost generation in-state, not multi-region contingency planning.

Where I think a Texas-like market could work better is if you layered competitive generation with enforceable capacity and resiliency standards, along with some interconnection flexibility. Right now, the market rewards generators for selling MWh in good weather, not for being ready in bad weather. That is the economic misalignment.

The EU freight analogy works in the sense that reliability is often a public-good investment. No private actor has the incentive to overbuild or maintain resources for rare events. Texas’s approach does not have to mean politics fully getting out of the way. It could mean using market signals to keep prices efficient while still mandating the backup, winterization, and grid-sharing capabilities that the economy needs.