Comment by BrenBarn
2 days ago
> First, disentangling individual accountability within a vast corporate structure is difficult, particularly in determining whether any executives had the requisite knowledge and intent to be held liable.
We just need lower standards of proof. Something like:
1) you had some level of responsibility within the organization (no specific knowledge of wrongdoing required) 2) some kind of violation occurred within the organization 3) your wealth increased over some time period in which such violations were later found to have occurred
If those things happened, you are liable. People who profit should be on the hook for everything a company does, not in proportion to their specific knowledge of or involvement in any particular illegal activities, but in proportion to their nominal or "global" level of responsibility and the magnitude of their profit.
New blackmail scheme:
Get some sort of job in the company, do something illegal, threaten your manager with going to the feds, since at this point they are criminally liable for your act.
More generally, i get where you are coming from - its frustrating when the ceos are like, i just work here, totally wasn't me, excuse me while i cash my bonus cheque. But i still think morally its important that we punish people for things they actually did (or failed to do), not just by mere association.
Although perhaps something like an enhanced version of how supervisory responsibility in war crimes works would make sense - basically the way that works is if you are aware or ought to have been aware that someone under you is commiting a crime, and you don't investigate/take measures to punish/take measures to stop them, you are on the hook for the crime.
> Get some sort of job in the company, do something illegal, threaten your manager with going to the feds, since at this point they are criminally liable for your act.
Not if the manager goes to the feds himself.
> But i still think morally its important that we punish people for things they actually did (or failed to do), not just by mere association.
Well imagine you're a CEO and you not only didn't setup protections against wrongdoing but rather created a system of incentives that makes it beneficial to close your eyes to things.
In the Dieselgate the engineer went to jail, in Skyguide the air traffic controller got stabbed, the executives walk free.
> Get some sort of job in the company, do something illegal, threaten your manager with going to the feds, since at this point they are criminally liable for your act.
I guess I left out a key word in my conclusion there: "You are presumptively liable." The point is to shift the burden of proof. If it can be proven that someone else willfully did the violation (especially in order to screw you), that might be a defense. But the point is that the default assumption should be that greater responsibility/authority equals greater liability, and the burden should be on those with that responsibility/authority to prove that they are not liable.
> But i still think morally its important that we punish people for things they actually did (or failed to do), not just by mere association.
But that's it exactly. What they failed to do was ensure that bad things didn't happen while they were in charge.
> Although perhaps something like an enhanced version of how supervisory responsibility in war crimes works would make sense - basically the way that works is if you are aware or ought to have been aware that someone under you is commiting a crime, and you don't investigate/take measures to punish/take measures to stop them, you are on the hook for the crime.
Yes, something like that. The key phrase being "or ought to have been".
I want to agree with the standard “it happened under your watch and it doesn’t matter if it happened without your knowledge”, but wouldn’t it get really messy in practice?
Let’s say one particular org at a company engaged in the activity in question, generating increased profits for the whole company. Taking this approach to the extreme, literally every shareholder could be liable because they benefited from those profits.
I could be persuaded it's worth having a lower standard of liability for "sibling" orgs within a company, so that if, e.g., the billing department does something shady then the HR department doesn't necessarily bear liability for that (but execs above both still would).
But I'm kind of okay with shareholders being liable to a certain extent, as long as their liability is proportional to their benefit. Someone who had a few shares in their 401k and made a couple thousand dollars, okay, no big deal. But the prospect of having gains clawed back could make shareholders more vigilant in ensuring the company is fully aboveboard. It doesn't make sense for me to someone to rake in, say, $50 million in unrealized gains and then say "oh, I had no idea, oh well, I'll just enjoy my $50 million". It's sort of like how if a drug kingpin gets arrested, it may well be that assets of their family members are seized as ill-gotten gains.