Comment by choppaface
5 months ago
Yes but two other considerations:
1) Assume the buyer/seller holds capital from sources that the majority of the market considers “illicit” and/or is legally sanctioned and/or physically frozen or restricted. Aka the capital can never be called (or at a discount that is unknowable) or the transaction could be later legally reversed or nullified by one or more legal entities. But of course the StableCoin market maker fails to communicate this risk. Therefore the real value of either side of the trade could be zero despite the non-zero StableCoins being transferred. Thus that’s not really a “trade” because there are hidden substantial risks.
2) Along the lines of Matt Levine “Stablecoin treasury strategy?” Consider that the buyer is a publicly listed company, and they fundraise based upon purchase of the digital asset. Then you are doing what most banks consider is not trading but fueling speculation (and normally you can’t expose average retail investors to these risks).
The innovation of StableCoins is much less about Capitalism and much more about re-packaging fraud. And given how lax the prosecution of fraud was during the Financial Crisis, there’s a big meta-bet that StableCoin “traders” will never face losses.
>Assume the buyer/seller holds capital from sources that the majority of the market considers “illicit” and/or is legally sanctioned and/or physically frozen or restricted
This is not feasible legally, and is where your claim falls apart.
From the now-passed GENIUS act [0] which regulates the stablecoin issuer:
- "Permitted payment stablecoin issuers must maintain reserves backing outstanding payment stablecoins on at least a one-to-one basis, consisting only of certain specified assets, including US dollars and short-term Treasuries."
[0]: https://www.lw.com/en/insights/the-genius-act-of-2025-stable...
Their point is that if the money held in reserve are proceeds from criminal activity, it is possible for the assets to be seized or frozen by the feds (which would render them no longer backed 1-to-1 even if they were before then). The text of the law you quoted doesn't really change anything.
I see, I misread: that’s interesting. I would assume the issuer would still be liable to resolve the backing, but yeah I could see how that poses systemic risk.
I also don’t think such a risk could realistically remain hidden - this is still going to be heavily regulated and audited, and industry will wise up to the sorts of risk that emerge.