Comment by bb88
10 hours ago
QUIC could be allowed, but only if it can be decrypted by the adversarial admin.
If the data can't be decrypted (or doesn't look like plain text web traffic) by the adversarial network admin, the QUIC connection can just be blocked.
Work laptops typically have a root cert installed allowing the company to snoop on traffic. It's not unfeasible for a nation state to require one for all devices either.
Are you arguing "QUIC has no more of a chance of getting through than Wireguard" or "QUIC doesn't stop all forms of blocking from working"? Nobody will disagree with the latter, regardless of protocol, but I'm not sure I follow on what these points have to do with the former.
If you work in a highly monitored environment, all HTTPS transactions are decoded -- because typically there's a root cert installed. That is one form of an adversarial admin, say. You can limit HTTPS traffic to port 443, and only allow it if the firewall can see the full TLS handshake. You can maybe see China doing this, e.g.
The next step is to block all connections that can't be decoded by the root cert. That's not really that far off when you think about it. If it's not typical HTTPS/HTML traffic, the adversarial network admin can simply drop packets and connections.
A similar thing is happening today in Spain when a soccer game is on. If anything looks suspicious they pretty much block the subnet, because it's easier to block entire subnets than to figure out how to block the protocols that transmit the pirate stream. This is acceptable in Spain, I guess. I'm not sure why.
I'm arguing if an adversarial network admin decides to nix QUIC on the network because they can't detect a VPN, don't be surprised when it suddenly happens worldwide until QUIC helps them (or Broadcom, e.g.) figure out which streams are VPNs and which aren't.