Comment by alphazard
4 months ago
Containers (meaning Docker) happened because CGroups and namespaces were arcane and required lots of specialized knowledge to create what most of us can intuitively understand as a "sandbox".
Cgroups and namespaces were added to Linux in an attempt to add security to a design (UNIX) which has a fundamentally poor approach to security (shared global namespace, users, etc.).
It's really not going all that well, and I hope something like SEL4 can replace Linux for cloud server workloads eventually. Most applications use almost none of the Linux kernel's features. We could have very secure, high performance web servers, which get capabilities to the network stack as initial arguments, and don't have access to anything more.
Drivers for virtual devices are simple, we don't need Linux's vast driver support for cloud VMs. We essentially need a virtual ethernet device driver for SEL4, a network stack that runs on SEL4, and a simple init process that loads the network stack with capabilities for the network device, and loads the application with a capability to the network stack. Make building an image for that as easy as compiling a binary, and you could eliminate maybe 10s of millions of lines of complexity from the deployment of most server applications. No Linux, no docker.
Because SEL4 is actually well designed, you can run a sub kernel as a process on SEL4 relatively easily. Tada, now you can get rid of K8s too.
Containers and namespaces are not about security. They are about not having singleton objects at the OS level. Would have called it virtualization if the word wasn't so overloaded already. There is a big difference that somehow everyone misses. A bypassable security mechanism is worse than useless. A bypassable virtualization mechanism is useful. It is useful to be able to have a separate root filesystem just for this program - even if a malicious program is still able to detect it's not the true root.
As about SEL4 - it is so elegant because it leaves all the difficult problems to the upper layer (coincidentally making them much more difficult).
> Containers and namespaces are not about security
True. Yet containers, or more precisely the immutable images endemic to container systems, directly address the hardest part of application security: the supply chain. Between the low effort and risk entailed when revising images to address endlessly emerging vulnerabilities, and enabling systematized auditing of immutable images, container images provide invaluable tools for security processes.
I know about Nix and other such approaches. I also know these are more fragile than the deeply self-contained nature of containers and their images. That's why containers and their image paradigm have won, despite all the well-meaning and admirable alternatives.
> A bypassable security mechanism is worse than useless
Also true. Yet this is orthogonal to the issues of supply chain management. If tomorrow, all the problems of escapable containers were somehow solved, whether by virtual machines on flawless hypervisors, or formally verified microkernels, or any other conceivable isolation mechanism, one would still need some means to manage the "content" of disparate applications, and container systems and the image paradigm would still be applicable.
> I also know these are more fragile than the deeply self-contained nature of containers and their images
Not really. People only use Nix because it doesn't randomly break, bitrot or require arcane system setup.
Unlike containers. You really need k8s or something like it to mould Docker containers into something manageable.
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> As about SEL4 - it is so elegant because it leaves all the difficult problems to the upper layer (coincidentally making them much more difficult).
I completely buy this as an explanation for why SEL4 for user environments hasn't (and probably will never) take off. But there's just not that much to do to connect a server application to the network, where it can access all of its resources. I think a better explanation for the lack of server side adoption is poor marketing, lack of good documentation, and no company selling support for it as a best practice.
The lack of adoption is because it’s not a complete operating system.
Using sel4 on a server requires complex software development to produce an operating environment in which you can actually do anything.
I’m not speaking ill of sel4; I’m a huge fan, and things like it’s take-grant capability model are extremely interesting and valuable contributions.
It’s just not a usable standalone operating system. It’s a tool kit for purpose-built appliances, or something that you could, with an enormous amount of effort, build a complete operating system on top of.
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> But there's just not that much to do to connect a server application to the network, where it can access all of its resources.
If you only care to run stateless stuff that never write anything (or at least never read what they wrote) - it's comparatively easy. Still gotta deal with the thousand drivers - even on the server there are a lot of quirky stuff. But then you gotta run the database somewhere. And once you run a database you get all the problems Linus warned about. So you gotta run the database on a separate Linux box (at that point - what do you win vs. using Linux for everything?) or develop a new database tailored for SeL4 (and that's quite a bit more complex than an OS kernel). An elegant solution that only solves a narrow set of cases stands no chance over a crude solution that solves every case.
Also, with the current sexy containerized stacks it's easy to forget, but having same kind of environment on the programmer's workbench and on the sever was once Unix's main selling point. It's kinda expensive to support a separate abstraction stack for a single purpose.
> A bypassable security mechanism is worse than useless
Looks like the Nirvana fallacy.
> Containers and namespaces are not about security
An escape from properly configured container/namespaces is a kernel 0day. Or a 0day in whatever protocol the isolated workload talks to the outside with.
> Containers and namespaces are not about security
People keep saying that, but I do not get it. If an attack that would work without a container, fails from inside a container (e.g. because it cannot read or write a particular file, or it cannot) it is better security.
> A bypassable security mechanism is worse than useless.
It needs the bypass to exist, and it needs an extra step to actually bypass it.
Any security mechanism (short of air gaps) might have a bypass.
> even if a malicious program is still able to detect it's not the true root.
Also true for security unless it can read or write to the true root.
You can use containers as a security measure, but I'd argue that if (when) it fails in a spectacular way (see e. g. abstract sockets for an interesting past issue) it's your fault and not a zero-day in the kernel as a sibling comment suggest. To put it a bit less harsh - containers are not just for security and containerization tools have to balance security vs usability.
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Is that why containers started? I seem to recall them taking off because of dependency hell, back in the weird time when easy virtualization wasn't insanely available to everyone.
Trying to get the versions of software you needed to use all running on the same server was an exercise in fiddling.
I think there were multiple reasons why containers started to gain traction. If you ask 3 people why they started using containers, you're likely to get 4 answers.
For me, it was avoiding dependencies and making it easier to deploy programs (not services) to different servers w/o needing to install dependencies.
I seem to remember a meetup in SF around 2013 where Docker (was it still dotCloud back then?) was describing a primary use-case was easier deployment of services.
I'm sure for someone else, it was deployment/coordination of related services.
The big selling points for me were what you said about simplifying deployments, but also the fact that a container uses significantly less resource overhead than a full blown virtual machine. Containers really only work if your code works in user space and doesn't need anything super low level (eg TCP network stack), but as long as you stay in user space it's amazing.
The main initial drive for me was that it let me separately run many things without a) trying to manage separate dependency sets, and b) Sharing RAM - Without having to physically allocate large amounts of memory to virtual machines; on an 8GB machine at a couple per VM that doesn’t let you get far.
"making it easier to deploy" is a rather... clinical description for fixing the "but it works on my machine!" issue. We could go into detail on how it solved that, but imo it comes down to that.
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my view of docker, as a who thought it was a shallow wrapper on linux namespaces, is that it was a good fit for the average IT shop to solve the deployment friction
no more handmade scripts(or worse fully manual operations) stupid simple dockerfile scripts.. any employee would be able to understand and groups can organize around it
docker-compose tying services into their own subnet was really a cool thing though
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This matches my recollection. Easily repeatable development and test environments that would save developers headaches with reproduction. That then lead logically to replacement of Ansible etc for the server side with the same methodology.
There were many use cases that rapidly emerged, but this eclipsed the rest.
Docker Hub then made it incredibly easy to find and distribute base images.
Google also made it “cool” by going big with it.
iirc full virtualization was expensive ( vmware ) and paravirtualization was pretty heavyweight and slow ( Xen ). I think Docker was like a user friendlier cgroups and everyone loved it. I can't remember the name but there was a "web hosting company in a box" software that relied heavily on LXC and probably was some inspiration for containerization too.
edit: came back in to add reference to LXC, it's been probably 2 decades since i've thought about that.
LXD?
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On a personal level, that's why I started using them for self hosting. At work, I think the simplicity of scaling from a pool of resources is a huge improvement over having to provision a new device. Currently at an on-prem team and even moving to kubernetes without going to cloud would solve some of the more painful operational problems that send us pages or we have to meet with our prod support team about.
Yes, totally agree that's a contributor too. I should expand that by namespaces I mean user, network, and mount table namespaces. The initial contents of those is something you would have to provide when creating the sandbox. Most of it is small enough to be shipped around in a JSON file, but the initial contents of a mount table require filesystem images to be useful.
There are two answers to “why x happened”.
You’re talking about the needs it solves, but I think others were talking about the developments that made it possible.
My understanding is that Docker brought features to the server and desktop (dependency management, similarity of dev machine and production, etc), by building on top of namespacing capabilities of Linux with a usability layer on top.
Docker couldn’t have existed until those features were in place and once they existed it was an inevitability for them to be leveraged.
And what was the reason for the dependency hell?
Was it always so hard to build the software you needed on a single system?
Because our computers have global state all over the place, and people like it, as it simplifies a lot of things.
You could see that history repeat itself in Python - "pip install something" is way easier to do that messing with virtualenvs, and even works pretty well as long as number of package is small, so it was a recommendation for a long time. Over time, as number of Python apps on same PC grew, and as the libraries gained incompatible versions, people realized it's a much better idea to keep all things isolated in its own virtualenv, and now there are tools (like "uv" and "pipx") which make it trivial to do.
But there are no default "virtualenvs" for regular OS. Containers get closest. nix tries hard, but it is facing uphill battle - it goes very much "against the grain" of *nix systems, so every build script of every used app needs to be updated to work with it. Docker is just so much easier to use.
Golang has no dynamic code loading, so a lot of times it can be used without containers. But there is still global state (/etc/pki, /etc/timezone, mime.types , /usr/share/, random Linux tools the app might call on, etc...) so some people still package it in docker.
No. Back before dynamic objects, for instance, it was easier-of course, there were other challenges at the time.
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This makes sense if you look at containers as simply a means to an end of setting up a sandbox, but not really much sense at all if you think of containers as a way to make it easy to get an arbitrary application up and running on an arbitrary server without altering host system dependencies.
I suspect that containers would have taken off even without isolation. I think the important innovation of Docker was the image. It let people deploy consistent version of their software or download outside software.
All of the hassle of installing things was in the Dockerfile, and it was run in containers so more reliable.
I honestly think that Dockerfile was the biggest driver. Containers as a technology are useful, for the many reasons outlined in this thread. But what Dockerfiles achieved was to make the technology accessible to much wider and much less technically deep audience. The syntax is easy to follow, the vocabulary available for the DSL is limited, and the results are immediately usable.
Oh, and the layer caching made iterative development with _very_ rapid cycles possible. That lowered the bar for entry and raised the floor for everyone to get going easier.
But back to Dockerfiles. The configuration language used made it possible for anyone[tm] to build a container image, to ship a container image and to run the container. Fire-and-forget style. (Operating the things in practice and at any scale was left as an exercise for the reader.)
And because Anyone[tm] could do it, pretty much anyone did. For good and ill alike.
I agree: I think the container image is what matters. As it turns out, getting more (or less) isolation given that image format is not a very hard problem.
> I think the important innovation of Docker was the image. It let people deploy consistent version of their software or download outside software.
What did it let people do that they couldn't already do with static linking?
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Agreed. There was a point where I thought AMIs would become the unit of open source deployment packaging, and I think docker filled that niche in a cloud-agnostic way
ps I still miss the alternate universe where Kenton won the open source deployment battle :-)
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> Because SEL4 is actually well designed, you can run a sub kernel as a process on SEL4 relatively easily. Tada, now you can get rid of K8s too.
k8s is about managing clusters of machines as if they were a single resource. Hence the name "borg" of its predecessor.
AFAIK, this isn't a use case handled by SEL4?
The K8s master is just a scheduling application. It can run anywhere, and doesn't depend on much (just etcd). The kublet (which runs on each node) is what manages the local resources. It has a plugin architecture, and when you include one of each necessary plugin, it gets very complicated. There are plugins for networking, containerization, storage.
If you are already running SEL4 and you want to spawn an application that is totally isolated, or even an entire sub-kernel it's not different than spawning a process on UNIX. There is no need for the containerization plugins on SEL4. Additionally the isolation for the storage and networking plugins would be much better on SEL4, and wouldn't even really require additional specialized code. A reasonable init system would be all you need to wire up isolated components that provide storage and networking.
Kubernetes is seen as this complicated and impressive piece of software, but it's only impressive given the complexity of the APIs it is built on. Providing K8s functionality on top of SEL4 would be trivial in comparison.
I understand what you're saying, and I'm a fan of SEL4. But isolation isn't one of the primary points of k8s.
Containerization is after all, as you mentioned, a plugin. As is network behavior. These are things that k8s doesn't have a strong opinion on beyond compliance with the required interface. You can switch container plugin and barely notice the difference. The job of k8s is to have control loops that manage fleets of resources.
That's why containers are called "containers". They're for shipping services around like containers on boats. Isolation, especially security isolation, isn't (or at least wasn't originally) the main idea.
You manage a fleet of machines and a fleet of apps. k8s is what orchestrates that. SEL4 is a microkernel -- it runs on a single machine. From the point of view of k8s, a single machine is disposable. From the point of view of SEL4, the machine is its whole world.
So while I see your point that SEL4 could be used on k8s nodes, it performs a very different function than k8s.
The scheduler is the least interesting thing about k8s. The extensible API common to all operating environments is the real value add.
As others mentioned containers aren’t about security either, I think you’re rather missing the whole purpose of the cloud native ecosystem here.
> Kubernetes is seen as this complicated and impressive piece of software, but it's only impressive given the complexity of the APIs it is built on.
There are other reasons it's impressive. Its API and core design is incredibly well-designed and general, something many other projects could and should learn from.
But the fact that it's impressive because of the complexity of the APIs it's built on is certainly a big part of its value. It means you can use a common declarative definition to define and deploy entire distributed systems, across large clusters, handling everything from ingress via load balancers to scaling and dynamic provisioning at the node level. It's essentially a high-level abstraction for entire data centers.
seL4 overlaps with that in a pretty minimal way. Would it be better as underlying infrastructure than the Linux kernel? Perhaps, but "providing K8s functionality on top of SEL4" would require reimplementing much of what Linux and various systems on top of it currently provide. Hardly "trivial in comparison".
You're just replacing the functionality of CRI, which is already pluggable. Rest of the kubernetes is still needed.
You have solved the isolation and some storage problems for a single node. You have not solved for scaling that to 10s, 100s, 1000s of nodes. That's where Kubernetes comes in. You made a lot of good points, but "you no longer need k8s" is not one of them.
It would be great if we got "kernel independent" Nvidia drivers. I have some experience with bare-metal development and it really seems like most of what an operating system provides could be provided in a much better way as a set of libraries that make specific pieces of hardware work, plus a very good "build" system.
> which has a fundamentally poor approach to security
Unix was not designed to be convenient for VPS providers. It was designed to allow a single computer to serve an entire floor of a single company. The security approach is appropriate for the deployment strategy.
As it did with all OSes, the Internet showed up, and promptly ruined everything.
cgroups first came from resource management frameworks that IIRC came out of IBM and got into some distro kernels for a time but not upstream.
Namespaces were not an attempt to add security, but just grew out of work to make interfaces more flexible, like bind mounts. And Unix security is fundamentally good, not having namespaces isn't much of a point against it in the first place, but now it does have them.
And it's going pretty well indeed. All applications use many kernel features, and we do have very secure high performance web and other servers.
L4 systems have been around for as long as Linux, and SEL4 in particular for 2 decades. They haven't moved the needle much so I'd say it's not really going all that well for them so far. SEL4 is a great project that has done some important things don't get me wrong, but it doesn't seem to be a unix replacement poised for a coup.
> Unix security is fundamentally good
L. Ron Hubbard is fundamentally good!
I kid, but seriously, good how? Because it ensures cybersecurity engineers will always have a job?
seL4 is not the final answer, but something close to it absolutely will be. Capability-based security is an irreducible concept at a mathematical level, meaning you can’t do better than it, at best you can match it, and its certainly not matched by anything else we’ve discovered in this space.
> good how?
Good because it is simple both in terms of understanding it and implementing it, and sufficient in a lot of cases.
> seL4 is not the final answer, but something close to it absolutely will be. Capability-based security is an irreducible concept at a mathematical level, meaning you can’t do better than it, at best you can match it, and its certainly not matched by anything else we’ve discovered in this space.
Security is not pure math though, it's systems and people and systems of people.
cgroups are from Google. https://lwn.net/Articles/199643/
Yes but I don't see how you are addressing what I wrote. What are you getting at?
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> Cgroups and namespaces were added to Linux in an attempt to add security to a design (UNIX) which has a fundamentally poor approach to security (shared global namespace, users, etc.)
Namespacing of all resources (no restriction to a shared global namespace) was actually taken directly from plan9. It does enable better security but it's about more than that; it also sets up a principled foundation for distributed compute. You can see this in how containerization enables the low-level layers of something like k8s - setting aside for the sake of argument the whole higher-level adaptive deployment and management that it's actually most well-known for.
> I hope something like SEL4 can replace Linux for cloud server workloads eventually.
Why not 9front and diskless Linux microVMs, Firecracker/Kata-containers style?
Filesystem and process isolation in one, on an OS that's smaller than K8s?
Keep it simple and Unixy. Keep the existing binaries. Keep plain-text config and repos and images. Just replace the bottom layer of the stack, and migrate stuff to the host OS as and when it's convenient.
The story I heard was that containers let you use less memory and better share the kernel and CPU compared to Virtual Machines, such that you could run more applications on the same servers. This translates into direct cost savings, which is why large companies with large server farms were willing to pay their engineers to develop the technology and transition to the technology.
In terms of security, I think even more secure than SEL4 or containers or VMs would be having a separate physical server for each application and not sharing CPUs or memory at all. Then you have a security boundary between applications that is based in physics.
Of course, that is too expensive for most business use cases, which is why people do not use it. I think using SEL4 will run into the same problem - you will get worse utilization out of the server compared to containers, so it is more expensive for business use cases and not attractive. If we want something to replace containers that thing would have to be both cheaper and more secure. And I'm not sure what that would be
> Drivers for virtual devices are simple, we don't need Linux's vast driver support for cloud VMs. We essentially need a virtual ethernet device driver for SEL4, a network stack that runs on SEL4, and a simple init process that loads the network stack with capabilities for the network device, and loads the application with a capability to the network stack. Make building an image for that as easy as compiling a binary, and you could eliminate maybe 10s of millions of lines of complexity from the deployment of most server applications. No Linux, no docker.
Wasn't this what unikernels were attempting a decade ago? I always thought they were neat but they never really took off.
I would totally be onboard with moving to seL4 for most cloud applications. I think Linux would be nearly impossible to get into a formally-verified state like seL4, and as you said most cloud stuff doesn't need most of the features of Linux.
Also seL4 is just cool.
I don't think Docker came about due to cgroups and namespaces being arcane, LXC was already abstracting that away.
Docker's claim to fame was connecting that existing stuff with layered filesystem images and packaging based off that. Docker even started off using LXC to cover those container runtime parts.
> Containers (meaning Docker) happened because CGroups and namespaces were arcane and required lots of specialized knowledge to create what most of us can intuitively understand as a "sandbox".
That might be why Docker was originally implemented, but why it "happened" is because everyone wanted to deploy Python and pre-uv Python package management sucks so bad that Docker was the least bad way to do that. Even pre-kubernetes, most people using Docker weren't using it for sandboxing, they were using it as fat jars for Python.
Not only python, although python is particularly bad.
Even java things wher fatjars exist you at some point end up with os level dependencies like "and this logging thing needs to be set up, and these dirs need these rights, and this user needs to be in place" etc. Nowadays you can shove that into a container
> namespaces were added to Linux in an attempt to add security to a design (UNIX) which has a fundamentally poor approach to security (shared global namespace, users, etc.)
If the "fundamentally poor approach to security" is a shared global namespace, why are namespaces not just a fix that means the fundamental approach to security is no longer poor?
You say applications and web servers kind of interchangeably. I don't know anything about SEL4. What if your application needs to spawn and manage executables as child processes? Is it Linux-like enough to run those and handle stuff like that so that those of us coding at the application layer don't need to worry about it too much?
can get you pretty lean already.
https://archive.kernel.org/oldwiki/tiny.wiki.kernel.org/
seems like all this was part of a long evolution.
I think the whole thing has been levels of abstraction around a runtime environment.
in the beginning we had the filesystem. We had /usr/bin, /usr/local/bin, etc.
then chroot where we could run an environment
then your chgroups/namespaces
then docker build and docker run
then swarm/k8s/etc
I think there was a parallel evolution around administration, like configure/make, then apt/yum/pacman, then ansible/puppet/chef and then finally dockerfile/yaml
The irony is that dockerfile/yaml contains so much ugly bash code nowadays that it feels like we are back at configure/make stage.
Luckily, no Dockerfile is ever as bad as old "configure" scripts were.
As long I never have to worry about configure snippets that deal with Sun's CC compiler from 1990's, or with gcc-3, I will be happy.
If you are talking about the
thing, I completely agree.
I've always wondered if there could be something like:
to accomplish something similar, or maybe:
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> which get capabilities to the network stack as initial arguments, and don't have access to anything more
Systemd does this and it is widely used.
Linux is already being replaced by type 1 hypervisors on cloud server workloads.
Anyone doing deployments in managed languages, regardless of AOT compiled, or using a JIT, the underlying operating system is mostly irrelevant, with exception of some corner cases regarding performance tweeks and such.
Even if those type 1 hypervisors happen to depend on Linux kernel for their implementation, it is pretty much transparent when using something like Vercel, or Lambda.
Why go a step further and deploy all cloud workloads using webassembly?