Comment by tptacek
1 day ago
The security model of Telegram is essentially that of Slack, plus a seldom-used direct E2EE messenger. You literally can't trust Slack or Telegram. You can opt not to trust Signal; I don't care. But it's at least an option.
Nice try sneaking Slack into a 1:1 secure messaging debate… That’s like comparing a corporate chatroom (with admin access) to a personal diary.
Telegram’s client-server default, with optional E2EE, is closer to pre-Microsoft Skype: tight client/network control, 1:1 focus, no major leaks despite a major spotlight on it for a decade+
You dodged Skype because it’s not the piñata Slack is. Weak move.
That's exactly the security model of Telegram. If you want to say "Skype", fine, Skype is also not a trustable secure messenger. I think we've reached an agreement.
Honestly pretty satisfying, I've never managed to drive an argument about Telegram being OK all the way to "Telegram is just as good as Skype".
You’re always so quick to call Signal the gold standard, but in reality, it’s not the untouchable system you claim.
I’d trust pre-Microsoft Skype, Telegram, and Signal about the same; none are bulletproof when the provider controls both client and server.
That’s the real crux, and you’re glossing over it. Skype pre-2011 ran TLS and encrypted storage, held up under global scrutiny with no major leaks, and matched Telegram’s client-server model with optional E2EE.
Post-Microsoft? it got gutted: NSA’s PRISM, Chinese eavesdropping, Mac OS X backdoors, the works.
This proves my point: when client and server are under one roof, a compromise, hack or coercion becomes possible.
Signal’s Double Ratchet E2EE, that locks down past and future messages against server breaches and its open-source code plus reproducible builds invite scrutiny that makes backdoors harder to hide, but here’s the truth: Signal’s client and server are still one entity and they have hid updates from users before. A malicious update, pushed via TOLA or CLOUD Act pressure, can snag plaintext before encryption, E2EE be damned.
Most users don’t verify builds. Transparency’s nice, but it’s not a forcefield. Telegram’s optional E2EE and Skype’s old-school TLS setup aren’t inherently worse for low-threat users who just need protection from external hacks, not state-level malice.
You’re waving Signal’s flag like it’s untouchable, but in practice, the provider’s grip on the client levels the playing field. That’s why I stick to OMEMO or OTR over XMPP or IRC: decentralised, battle-tested protocols that don’t chain me to one entity’s whims. I run them myself, no middleman, no trust roulette. Your “agreement” smells like a victory lap, but you’re dodging the real issue: single-entity control is the Achilles’ heel, not the protocol’s name.