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Comment by strogonoff

2 months ago

> talking of a claim like this is pointless.

Not at all. The confusion you expressed in your original comment stems from that claim. If you want to overcome that confusion, we have to talk about that claim.

Your statement was that it’s unclear how a bunch of valves doesn’t understand, but chemical processes do, and maybe you have a wrong intuition. Well, it appears that your intuition is to make this claim of causality, that some sort of object (e.g., valves or neurons), which you believe is part of objective reality, is what would have to cause understanding to exist.

So, I pointed out that assumption of such causality is not a provable claim, it is part of monistic materialism, which is a philosophical view, not scientific fact.

Further hinting at your tendency to assume monistic materialism is calling the systems “functionally identical”. It’s fairly evident that they are not functionally identical if one of them understands and the other doesn’t; it’s easy to make this mistake if you subconsciously already decide that understanding isn’t really a thing that exists (as many monistic materialists do).

> Like understanding, I haven't seen a particularly useful definition of consciousness that works around the edges.

Inability to define consciousness is fine, because logically circular definitions are difficult. However, lack of definition for the phenomenon is not the same thing as denying its objective existence.

You can escape the necessity to admit its existence by waving it away as an illusion or “not really” existing. Which is absolutely fine, as long as you recognize that it’s simply a workaround to not have to define things (if it’s an illusion, whom does it act on?), that conscious illusionism is just as unfalsifiable and unprovable as any other philosophical view about the nature of reality or consciousness, and that logically it’s quite ridiculous to dismiss as illusion literally the only thing that we empirically have direct unmediated access to.

> It's not mostly mimicking, it's exactly identical.

> Both cases with a person inside answering questions act identically and you can never design a test to tell which room has the tin of beans in.

If you constructed a system A that produces some output, and there is a system B, which you did not construct and which you don't have an full understanding of how it works, which produces identical output but is also believed to produce other output that cannot be measured with current technology (a.k.a. feelings and understanding), you have two options: 1) say that if we cannot measure something today then it certainly doesn’t matter, doesn’t exist, etc., or 2) admit that system A could be a p-zombie.

> It’s fairly evident that they are not functionally identical

Then you could tell the difference and the thought experiment is broken. The whole point is that outside observers can’t tell. Not that they’re too stupid, that there isn’t a way they could tell, no question they could ask.

> but is also believed to produce other output that cannot be measured with current technology

Are you suggesting that Searle was saying that there was a difference between the rooms and that we just needed more advanced technology to see inside them? Come on.

  • > The whole point is that outside observers can’t tell.

    I tried to explain that outside observers may not observe the entirety of what matters, whether due to current technical limitations or fundamental impossibility. In fact, to assume externally observed behaviour (e.g., of a human) is all that matters strikes me as a pretty fringe view.

    > Are you suggesting that Searle was saying that there was a difference between the rooms and that we just needed more advanced technology to see inside them

    Perhaps you are trying to read too much into what the experiment itself is. I do not treat it as “Searle tried to tell us something this way”. If he wanted to say something more specific he probably had done it in relevant works. The thought experiment however is very clear and describable in a paragraph and is open to possible interpretations, which is what we are doing now. That is the beauty of thought experiments like this.