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Comment by hollerith

4 months ago

In the actual world with the actual options available, rejecting the technology of the secure enclave has significant opportunity costs. In a theoretical reality in which one of the options available to you and I is a secure-enclave-independent microkernel OS on which you can run a mainstream browser, then you might be right that secure enclaves are unnecessary.

In the actual world, secure enclave is used for DRM, setting user permissions and running untrusted code as another user gets you 80% of the security you need if you don't trust something, and running it in a mostly empty container gets you another 19%. Unless you have a habit of running dubious code that you grant network access and keep up to date to ensure it knows the latest exploits, practically speaking you're fine.

Of course the obvious solution is don't run malware. Android's need for security partly comes from the fact that the primary repository/store distributes tons of dubious code that it grants network access and keeps up to date. If you stick to e.g. F-droid and turn off automatic updates, you don't find yourself in this adversarial position.

  • >running untrusted code as another user gets you 80% of the security you need if you don't trust something, and running it in a mostly empty container gets you another 19%.

    Like I said, the Android team does not think so. Nor does the ChromeOS team, which uses selinux to sandbox the browser, something no other non-Android Linux distro does (except possibly secureblue, which sadly almost no one uses).