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Comment by gnfargbl

6 hours ago

The recent Azure DDoS used 500k botnet IPs. These will have been widely distributed across subnets and countries, so your blocking approach would not have been an effective mitigation.

Identifying and dynamically blocking the 500k offending IPs would certainly be possible technically -- 500k /32s is not a hard filtering problem -- but I seriously question the operational ability of internet providers to perform such granular blocking in real-time against dynamic targets.

I also have concerns that automated blocking protocols would be widely abused by bad actors who are able to engineer their way into the network at a carrier level (i.e. certain governments).

> 500k /32s is not a hard filtering problem

Is this really true? What device in the network are you loading that filter into? Is it even capable of handling the packet throughput of that many clients while also handling such a large block list?

It also completely overlooks the fact that some of the traffic has spoofed source IP addresses and a bad actor could use automated black holing to knock a legitimate site offline.

  • > a bad actor could use automated black holing to knock a legitimate site offline.

    No, in my concept the host can only manage the traffic targeted at it and not at other hosts.