Comment by nostrademons

Knowing not so much about Tor but some about math: the number of nodes you need to compromise in order to de-anonymize a Tor user is exponential in the number of hops. Google says there are roughly 7000 Tor nodes, including 2000 guards (entry) and 1000 exit nodes. If you have a single hop, there's roughly a 1/1000 chance that you will connect to a single malicious node that can de-anonymize you, going up linearly with the number of nodes an attacker controls. If you have 3 hops, you have a 1 in 1000 * 7000 * 2000 = roughly 14 billion chance. 2 hops would give you 1 in 2 million, 4 hops would give you 1 in 1000 * 7000 * 7000 * 2000 = 98 trillion. In practical terms 1:14B is about the same as 1:98T (i.e. both are effectively zero), but 1:2M is a lot higher.