Comment by manarth

I agree that comparing the various sensor data points could allow a reasonable conclusion: e.g. IAS is variable across sensors therefore IAS is unreliable, so what additional information could allow a reasonable diagnosis?

The flight system could identify a stall and prominently alert the pilots. That's one of the recommendations from the report: to implement a dedicated stall warning. The stall warning was actually active, but disregarded/unrecognised by the pilots because of the number of other simultaneous alarms and extraneous information, including an intermittent recommendation from the Flight Director system to pitch up at 12°.

In general, Airbus aircraft don't have a dedicated AOA indicator visible to the pilots; instead AOA is visualised to the pilots by proxy via the airpeed indicator.

For AF447 the flight avionics probably had enough information to bring the aircraft back to straight and level flight without pilot input.

On the other hand the 737 Max crashes were attributed to MCAS overriding the pilot input and lowering the nose, in response to incorrect/faulty AOA sensor data.

Both were extreme examples, and the recommendations probably coalesce somewhere in the middle: better information (and alert prioritisation) for pilots and redundancy in sensors and logic.

Air Astana Flight 1388 also comes to mind. I'm not sure how a flight control system would deduct cross-connected aileron controls and adapt accordingly (without introducing other risks or failure modes). Given the glacial pace of change and approval in aviation, we're probably 20–50 years away from that level of autonomy.