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Comment by constantcrying

10 hours ago

I think the idea is interesting, but immensely flawed.

The following is just disingenuous:

>industrialisation of printing processes led to paperback genre fiction

>industrialisation of agriculture led to ultraprocessed junk food

>industrialisation of digital image sensors led to user-generated video

Industrialization of printing was the necessary precondition for mass literacy and mass education. The industrialization of agriculture also ended hunger in all parts of the world which are able to practice it and even allows for export of food into countries which aren't (Without it most of humanity would still be plowing fields in order not to starve). The digital image sensor allows for accurate representations of the world around us.

The framing here is that industrialization degrades quality and makes products into disposable waste. While there is some truth to that, I think it is pretty undeniable that there are massive benefits which came with it. Mass produced products often are of superior quality and superior longevity and often are the only way in which certain products can be made available to large parts of the population.

>This is not because producers are careless, but because once production is cheap enough, junk is what maximises volume, margin, and reach.

This just is not true and goes against all available evidence, as well as basic economics.

>For example, prior to industrialisation, clothing was largely produced by specialised artisans, often coordinated through guilds and manual labour, with resources gathered locally, and the expertise for creating durable fabrics accumulated over years, and frequently passed down in family lines. Industrialisation changed that completely, with raw materials being shipped intercontinentally, fabrics mass produced in factories, clothes assembled by machinery, all leading to today’s world of fast, disposable, exploitative fashion.

This is just pure fiction. The author is comparing the highest quality goods at one point in time, who people took immense care of, with the lowest quality stuff people buy today, which is not even close to the mean clothing people buy. The truth is that fabrics have become far better and far more durable and versatile. The products have become better, but what has changed is the attitude of people towards their clothing.

Lastly, the author is ignoring the basic economics which separate software from physical goods. Physical goods need to be produced, which is almost always the most expensive part. This is not the case for software, distributing software millions of times is not expensive and only a minuscule part of the total costs. For fabrics industrialization has meant that development costs increased immensely, but per unit production costs fell sharply. What we are seeing with software is a slashing of development costs.

I agree with you on all of this, and found myself wondering if the author had actually studied the Industrial Revolution at all.

The Industrial Revolution created a flywheel: you built machines that could build lots of things better and for less cost than before, including the parts to make better machines that could build things even better and for less cost than before, including the parts to make better machines... and on and on.

The key part to industrialisation in the 19th-century framing, is that you have in-built iterative improvement: by driving down cost, you increase demand (the author covers this), which increases investment in driving down costs, which increases demand, and so on.

Critically, this flywheel has exponential outputs, not linear. The author shows Jevons paradox, and the curve is right there - note the lack of straight line.

I'm not sure we're seeing this in AI software generation yet.

Costs are shifting in people's minds, from developer salaries to spending on tokens, so there's a feeling of cost reduction, but that's because a great deal of that seems to be heavily subsidised today.

It's also not clear that these AI tools are being used to produce exponentially better AI tools - despite the jump we saw ~GPT-3.5, quantitive improvement in output seems to remain linear as a function of cost, not exponential. Yet investment input seems to be exponential (this makes it feel more like a bubble).

I'm not saying that industrialisation of the type the author refers to isn't possible (and I'd even say most industrialisation of software happened back in the 1960s/70s), or that the flywheel can't pick up with AI, just that we're not quite where they think it is.

I'd also argue it's not a given that we're going to see the output of "industrialisation" drive us towards "junk" as a natural order of things - if anything we'll know it's not a junk bubble when we do in fact see the opposite, which is what optimists are betting on being just around the corner.