Comment by max_lt
4 hours ago
Fair point. The V8 isolate provides memory isolation, and we enforce CPU limits (100ms) and memory caps (128MB). Workers run in separate isolates, not separate processes, so it's similar to Cloudflare's model. That said, for truly untrusted third-party code, I'd recommend running the whole thing in a container/VM as an extra layer. The sandboxing is more about resource isolation than security-grade multi-tenancy.
I think you should consider adjusting the marketing to reflect this. "untrusted JavaScript" -> "JavaScript", "Secure sandboxing with CPU (100ms) and memory (128MB) limits per worker" -> "Sandboxing with CPU (100ms) and memory (128MB) limits per worker", overhauling https://openworkers.com/docs/architecture/security.
Over promising on security hurts the credibility of the entire project - and the main use case for this project is probably executing trusted code in a self hosted environment not "execut[ing] untrusted code in a multi-tenant environment".
Great point, thanks. Just updated the site – removed "untrusted" and "secure", added a note clarifying the threat model