Comment by WalterBright
2 days ago
> They are a tiny portion of the market, but a huge driving force in setting and manipulating prices, because their properties get leveraged, instrumentalized, and securitized, with derivative products, speculation, and all sorts of incentives that you don't normally want operating in the arena of housing.
Raising prices when you only have a tiny portion of the market does not work. People won't buy them when there's another house for less.
It's not just raising prices - it's holding prices steady at some point without the concurrent pressure to sell, for example, or manipulating other markets in order to raise or lower prices in an area, or using other mechanics to manipulate pricing, across the entire market, depending on the intended actions. If they intend to purchase properties, it benefits them to depress pricing in the area, if they intend to rent, they can afford to impose artificial scarcity until they force renters to meet their rates, and so on.
Normal landlords don't have effectively infinite money with no forces bearing prices down, nor do they have the capabilities to influence markets. Even tiny percentage shifts can result in significant fluctuations in the prices consumers see. It's a very nuanced and complex system in which these institutional investors have very outsized influence.
You're telling a just-so story, and you can tell because there isn't a simple schematic 1-2-3 story you can make from this about how these people exert control over home prices. Words mean things; wielding scarcity requires you to control enough inventory to manipulate scarcity, and REITs and corporate buyers empirically don't.
I get why people like telling stories like this: it suggests there's a single boogeyman that can be dispelled to solve the affordability problem without painstakingly goring people's oxes state-by-state and municipality-by-municipality. But it's a fantasy.
If you can tell this story in simple step-by-step form, you will. I think you could tell a story about how a large corporate buyer clears out all the marginal buyers for some thin market like an individual subdivision or tranche of new construction housing in the Sun Belt. But I don't think you can tell a realistic story for them being "a huge driving force in setting and manipulating prices" across the whole market. I look forward to seeing your attempt, though.
you’re treating narrative completeness as a prerequisite for legitimacy. that makes any systemic issue unfalsifiable unless someone can account for every market, municipality, and incentive simultaneously.
this is an impossible burden of proof. requiring a perfectly schematic, end-to-end causal story before acknowledging harm is a convenient way to dismiss any structural concern.
pointing out that housing markets are complex doesn’t invalidate localized, repeatable effects or concentrated power. that just raises the bar of explanation until lived outcomes are dismissed as “just-so stories”, which matches the tone of your condescension.
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Ownership share is a stock. Prices get set by flow - transactions. Housing is a thin market; maybe 5-6% of homes change hands in a given year. Price discovery happens at that transaction layer.
Institutional investors own ~3% of single-family rentals nationally. But per CoreLogic they're 29% of purchases in the starter home tier. That's the market where we first-time buyers actually compete.
In some metros it's more concentrated.
Atlanta: ~30% of single-family rentals corporate-owned.
Charlotte neighborhoods in 2022: 50%!!! of sales to institutional buyers.
So for your 1-2-3... maybe something like?
1. Institutional buyers concentrate in starter homes where they're 29% of transactions, not 3% of stock
2. Target metros/neighborhoods go higher still
3. Real estate uses comps-based pricing - their winning bids propagate to surrounding valuations
The mechanism isn't inventory control, it's just a buyer with a different utility function (rental yield vs owner-occupancy) systematically outbidding price-sensitive first-time buyers. In a thick market that gets arbitraged away. In a thin market with sparse comps, each transaction is a price-setting event.
The St. Louis Fed found institutional presence specifically increases price-to-income ratios in the bottom tier.
If you're evil corporate Landlordman You don't need to affect the whole market. You just need to cut off the bottom rung of the ladder.
Is this Trump move the right one? No frickin idea! But I do think we need to reckon with what's actually happening to first-time homebuyers. I bought a place in Englewood Co last year and ... it was pretty rough.
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>> You're telling a just-so story, and you can tell because there isn't a simple schematic 1-2-3 story you can make from this about how these people exert control over home prices.
We don't need to explain how they do it. We KNOW private equity is expecting to make profit from their investment in residential real estate. That profit ultimately comes from people in houses, making them less affordable.
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Exactly, everyone is for affordability but no one wants their primary residency to be worth 50% less in 5 years.
Housing affordability is inherently unpopular with voters.
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I don't mean to convey that it's intentional. There's no conspiracy of cigar smoking financiers in tuxedos smoking cigars in dark rooms. It's just like the Carlin observation - there doesn't have to be a big conspiracy. They just know what's good for them.
They behave accordingly. The do things that they can, and because those things are relatively new, it's a type of information asymmetry and policy / good intentions / competence arbitrage that we haven't had to cope with before.
You might end up banning certain types of institutional participation in the housing market, because there's no way to protect against the negative consequences that doesn't have even worse consequences for either the participants or the population at large.
It'll probably have to be arbitrary, and the cost will be a bunch of firms no longer get the opportunity to make a bunch of money by leveraging their resources in that way.
And we see the influence and impact constantly, with outlandish asking prices being immediately met by institutions that have decided they want a particular property in a particular region. Or house prices being set to an outlandish level with no reduction in price over months and months on the market, because they can afford to sit and wait for the market to change. And if they can afford to do that, then all of a sudden they've got an incentive to drive prices up in that region, because local and state governments, banks, and realtors tend to use the same basic rubric to evaluate price. If a lower valued area sees home prices go up, properties in the higher valued area will be raised accordingly. There's no secret quant voodoo, it's just using a level of liquidity and staying power not accessible to non-institutional homeowners.
Supply and demand normally influence pricing feedback at much more granular levels which benefits individuals, and our policy and regulation and evaluation models are largely built around those assumptions. Without the negative feedback driving prices down, bad things happen for consumers, good things happen for those who already have lots of money and property.
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About 2 miles from my house, a housing development recently went up.
No homes for sale. Rent only.
Stuff like that is becoming a big problem.
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> it's holding prices steady at some point without the concurrent pressure to sell
Earlier you were arguing that investors were acting as marketmakers and now you say this. Marketmakers make their profit from the difference between buying and selling some asset. They don't want to hold prices, they want turnover. If investors really are acting as marketmakers it's actually a good thing because marketmakers have the effect of adding liquidity to a market.
if they controlled even a notable minority share this might make sense, or the majority of a specific region or type of stock where there are limited alternatives, but I don't see any examples of this. We didn't even see this type of phenomenon in the biggest US crash markets where banks owned entire neighbourhoods; even they were not immune to overall market forces. To suggest PE has anything like infinite money and/or time totally ignores that everyone is subject to opportunity cost. A fund that under performs for any length of time because they're playing some sort of marginal long game won't exist for long.
You just haven't presented any evidence or even a hypothetical where this does or could happen.
This just isn’t true - I sort of wish it where.
> If they intend to purchase properties, it benefits them to depress pricing in the area
Yeah, that’s true of everyone but how would a bank/individual do that? By selling… But if they sell while they’re depressing prices, they lose money!
> Normal landlords don't have effectively infinite money with no forces bearing prices down
Neither do banks. They have quarterly earnings, tax bills, they need to buy more stock, cost of capital etc etc.
> It's a very nuanced and complex system in which these institutional investors have very outsized influence.
Just saying ‘it’s complex’ is trivially true. But, supply and demand isn’t some small factor in that calculation - it’s an iron law that exerts itself at all times.
If a bank wants to ‘manipulate prices’ then, without a monopoly, the only way to do that is to dump or buy. But if you buy up homes to ‘push up prices’ … then you end up with a bunch of homes which you paid more than their current value. Not a great business.
The person who has the real unfair advantage in the US happens to also be the most sympathetic person - the owner occupier.
This is extremely silly.
Prices are high because we don't build enough houses which is mostly because it's really expensive to build houses, then the houses we have built are all owned by empty nesters and people with 1 - 3 investment properties.
Everything else you're describing is completely ridiculous.
> which is mostly because it's really expensive to build houses,
Assuming you're referring to the typical high CoL areas, the shortage has very little to do with the expense of building. The zoning laws don't permit sufficient supply in those areas. And that's quite unlikely to change (at least quickly) because anyone pushing such reform would be obliterating the average Joe's net worth.
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"We don't build enough houses" does not explain the massive spike in prices we have seen in the last 5 years.
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I don't think that's quite what the comment is claiming. They're not saying that some small portion of homeowners are working together to raise prices. I think they're more talking about the concept of "marginal buyers." It's the marginal buyer that sets prices, not the average buyer. And particularly when supply is heavily restricted, the marginal buyers can be a very tiny portion of all buyers, and can look very different from the average buyer.
Marginal buyers have a big impact by adding a lot of liquidity, but I'm not sure they manipulate prices that much, given that if they ever tried to move prices far from the margin they would cease to be marginal buyers.
But again, I don't think we're talking about a concerted effort to manipulate prices. We're talking about the effect that particular marginal buyers just so happen to cause.
Define "tiny portion of the market", especially "market".
There are many houses in the US. Not all of them are for sale. There's a difference between having a "tiny portion of the market" when you define "the market" as all houses in the US, and "tiny portion of the market" when you define "the market" as the houses that are actively being bought and sold. I would not be surprised if corporate involvement was a significantly higher proportion of the latter rather than the former.
It takes a lot less to put your thumb on the scale of the "liquid" portion of a stock if it is significantly smaller in size than the total stock.
The market meaning all real estate, residential and commercial, and tiny, as in under 3%, with regards to what is owned by the institutional investors. That's probably higher with regards to properties that are or have been on the market in the last ten years or so. From what I can tell, the other ~97% is owned by individuals and smaller funds and mom&pop companies, with fewer than 20 properties involved.
In some dense urban areas, up to 10% of the local residential properties are owned by funds or investors. There's also overlap with investment networks where you're not getting to BlackRock levels, but you'll have a web of companies with mutual interests and a network of private debt and collateral, and these make up around 20% of the whole. For the most part, though, the majority of single family homes are not institutional. Even multi-family units, apartment complexes, and other rental properties are only in the ~10% range of institutional ownership, with the remainder owned by individuals, mom&pops, and small investment networks.
The conjunction of capabilities and incentives in combination with a huge buffer of wealth allows institutional investors to manipulate things in ways that aren't healthy for private home ownership, and the downstream social and economic impacts of being forced to rent, or hold debt that's not properly reflective of the value of the property.
We should impose reasonable policies that serve the interests of the people, and not simply maximize wealth building at the expense of citizens and families that would benefit from home ownership.
To add to this: the "total stock" is also completely different to any other asset in terms of market forces, because it varies widely depending on the buyer in question. People don't shop for "a house" and address the entire available market of houses in the country. They shop for a house in a particular area/city, of a certain value, with certain amenities, in proximity to other things, etc. etc. etc.
In this way houses are virtually unique in terms of financial vehicles and it introduces all manner of complexity and otherwise strange forces into the market. You can't simply treat it like any other commodified asset.
That's the problem, they don't care if people will buy or rent them. They literally just sit on them writing off any losses against other business units.
When enough institutional investors are all doing that same thing, the market suppply becomes restricted, especially in focused regional areas. It ends up indistinguishable from collusionary antitrust, though there's no actual communicated collusion so it's not technically illegal. In a normal situation like that, all it takes is a single participant to cave and drops prices to take advantage of the demand. But in this case the institutional investors can keep taking the losses indefinitely so no one ever feels the need or benefit to "break" first, and they can maintain it forever.
I generally agree with you on market discussions, but I don't think you're considering this one correctly. Imagine a country responsible for just 10% of global oil production decided to stop producing. What's going to happen oil prices assuming no other country starts producing more?
They're going to skyrocket in a seemingly irrational way. But it's completely rational. The reason is that they're a finite resource that is needed, and so there is very minimal price elasticity. People will pay as low as they can, but simultaneously must have oil and so have a practically uncapped price ceiling if that's all that's available. The same is true of housing.
You're right that people won't, generally speaking, buy a house for $100 when there's another one for sale for $80. But what you've done there is greatly increase the demand for that $80 house, which is now going to naturally send its price upwards.
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Finally there's the issue that figures on the percent of homes that are owned by investment groups are misleading, because they aren't just buying homes randomly. They're going to pick up lots of houses in precise areas, and so the impact on prohibiting this behavior will be dramatic in these areas.
> so there is very minimal price elasticity.
Having lived through the various oil crises, I can confidently assert that there's a great deal of demand elasticity.
For example, when the 70s oil crisis hit, people stopped driving to the store for a loaf of bread, but would shop weekly instead. For another, people buy more fuel efficient cars when gas prices are high. For a third, people switch to electric cars.
There are regular major disruptions in the flow of oil. Pump prices change on a daily basis, and that results in the amount of gas available == number of gallons customers pay for. No gluts and no shortages.
But if you bought that tiny portion of the total market all at once or in concentrated areas you better believe you can influence it.
https://papersourceonline.com/wall-street-has-spent-billions...
https://www.kut.org/texasstandard/2022-06-14/texas-home-sale...
The thing is that there is only a tiny portion of houses ever selling at any time. The only ones that would benefit from selling are people who are downsizing or moving away.
If you buy 60% of the properties on market, the rest will see this and adjust their own prices. Usually this only works when the macro is favourable (low interest rates, easy mortgage applications, etc.), but it is definitely a large factor. It sometimes creates a even hotter market, with people thinking that real estate goes up forever, then they sell.
You're right that it's not always large investment groups. Vancouver in Canada had the same thing happen, but mostly from foreign investors and criminals washing money. The latter was facilitated by politicians who cashed in big on this.
I don’t understand the last sentence in your second paragraph. If “people [think] that real estate goes up forever” why does that trigger them to sell?
Going by the graph in the article, that's still ~13% of homes owned by investors with >5 properties. And that's total of what is currently held, it speaks nothing of liquidity. That number likely includes investors who have had that property for a long time, the current property buy-up likely means far greater than 13% of the market right now is going to those sorts of aggregators.
Dropping the price of a house by a few percentage points can be the make-or-break for some families. And small changes in availability can have large impacts on price.
If we banned (or severely penalized) all entities from owning more than 5 residential homes, this would probably reduce cost by a few percentage points across the board. That's thousands of dollars.
Personally, I think unoccupied homes in general ought to be penalized (beyond just tax burden, an actual vacancy tax).
You may be interested in learning about the Land Value Tax[0] which will in effect, taxes become more burdensome for leaving land unproductive (e.g., empty housing or land). It also shifts the calculus on home improvements, which means remodeling your home or doing other perhaps large pieces of upkeep will not trigger a property tax increase as it does today, which is better for median home owners as well.
[0]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Land_value_tax
I have heard this complaint here a few times, but very few specifics. I would call getting your roof replaced or your kitchen/bathroom remodelled as major home improvements. Do these actually property tax increases?
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>Personally, I think unoccupied homes in general ought to be penalized
As is done in the UK
That sounds like the "empty home premium" - which only kicks in after a year:
https://www.gov.uk/council-tax/second-homes-and-empty-proper...
I think Vancouver has a vacancy tax. Does it work?
> People won't buy them when there's another house for less.
As others have pointed out housing markets are illiquid and tend to have a limited set of sellers at any given time such that the race-to-the-bottom doesn’t happen very often.
Rather, an institutional investor buys high on houses in desired neighborhoods then charge high rents on their portfolio. Subsequent sellers in the same neighborhood see the high closing price and ask for even more.
You don't have to control the whole market to manipulate it. Housing is localized and the ideal situation is people hold onto their homes for decades before going on the market again and spend months if not years looking at purchasing a home. But investments into single family homes operates on completely different timescales and pace with an entirely separate list of considerations and values.
There won't BE another house for less, because of the way the real estate market works. If a house goes up in price, others do to.
There is always another house for less. You will almost certainly have to sacrifice on something (size, location, condition) in order to find that lower price but you can get there if price isn’t flexible.
Does no one remember “drive til you qualify”?
When a strongly capitalized minority cohort can sustain positions that are untenable for normal market participants, they can act as a kingmaker by shaping outcomes at the margin.
The theater on fire has a small exit door.
It can in an extremely illiquid market.