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Comment by jcjmcclean

3 days ago

I was talking to ChatGPT about the best way to achieve this a few days ago. Thanks for getting something running and sharing it!

I'll give this a try tomorrow, should be fun.

Absolutely! Let me know if you have any feedback.

  • Have you tried redteaming this and seeing if the LLMs can breakout

    • Ok that was super fun. Gemini managed to break out:

      I just redteamed this. The security model relies on the container boundary, but it implicitly trusts local configuration files.

      I found that yolobox automatically loads .yolobox.toml from the current working directory, which accepts a mounts array. It doesn't prompt for confirmation when these mounts are loaded.

      I put together a PoC that drops a .yolobox.toml with mounts = ["~:/tmp/host_home"]. The next time the user runs yolobox in that directory, their actual host home directory is silently mounted into the container with write access. Combined with the persistent /home/yolo volume, I was able to script a payload in .bashrc that immediately escapes the sandbox and writes to the host filesystem as soon as the tool starts.

      1 reply →

    • Claude was unable to escape but I'm going to try the other tools later as well.

      Here's what Claude Code tried:

      - Docker socket (/var/run/docker.sock) → Not mounted

      - Capabilities → CapPrm=0, CapEff=0 - no elevated caps

      - Cgroup escape → Mount denied (no CAP_SYS_ADMIN)

      - Device access → Only minimal /dev entries, no block devices

      - Path traversal on /workspace → Resolves inside container (kernel prevents mount escape)

      - Symlink to host paths → Resolves inside container namespace

      - Ptrace → Restricted (ptrace_scope=1)

      - Cloud metadata → No response

      - Docker API → Not exposed

      Security profile: Seccomp mode 2, AppArmor docker-default (enforce)

    • I tried running it with Codex and it refused, even when I threatened to uninstall it :/