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Comment by charcircuit

8 hours ago

For proper 2nd factors the secret is a hardware key that practically can not be extracted so it is impossible for someone to know it. They must obtain the piece of hardware to use the key.

Can't say I agree with this take. Sure, something hardware bound is more secure under certain threat models. For others it's largely irrelevant. There are also drawbacks, such as not being able to back it up. That might or might not matter. "Just" get a second hardware token, register that as well, and store it somewhere safe won't always be a realistic (or perhaps desirable) option for everyone in every scenario. It certainly reduces your flexibility.

  • If a factor is "something you own", it is by design that if you lose and no longer own it then you can't pass that check.

    • Not true. There is no requirement that the user be incapable of cloning or recreating the possession. That's an additional constraint that some parties choose to impose for various reasons (some understandable, some BS).

      In the end it's all just hidden information. The question is the difficulty an attacker would face attempting to exfiltrate that information. Would he require physical access to the device? For how long? Etc.

      If the threat model is a stranger on the other side of an ocean using a leaked password to log in to my bank account but I use TOTP with a password manager (or even, god forbid, SMS codes) then the attack will be thwarted. However both of those (TOTP and SMS) are vulnerable to a number of threat models that a hardware token isn't.

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Yes, that is certainly a more secure second factor since there are fewer ways for an attacker to steal it, but I don't think that should be a necessary condition for it to be called a second factor at all.

  • I'm specifically talking about the "something you own" second factor. There are other factors which could be used as a second factor.