← Back to context

Comment by direwolf20

7 hours ago

Remote attestation is literally a form of DRM

There are genuine positive applications for remote attestation. E.g., if you maintain a set of servers, you can verify that it runs the software it should be running (the software is not compromised). Or if you are running something similar to Apple's Private Compute Cloud to run models, users can verify that it is running the privacy-preserving image that it is claiming to be running.

There are also bad forms of remote attestation (like Google's variant that helps them let banks block you if you are running an alt-os). Those suck and should be rejected.

Edit: bri3d described what I mean better here: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=46785123

> Remote attestation is literally a form of DRM

Let's say I accept this statement.

What makes you think trusted boot == remote attestation?

  • Trusted boot is literally a form of DRM. A different one than remote attestation.

    • > Trusted boot is literally a form of DRM. A different one than remote attestation.

      No, it's not. (And for that matter, neither is remote attestation)

      You're conflating the technology with the use.

      I believe that you have only thought about these technologies as they pertain to DRM, now I'm here to tell you there are other valid use cases.

      Or maybe your definition of "DRM" is so broad that it includes me setting up my own trusted boot chain on my own hardware? I don't really think that's a productive definition.

      2 replies →