Comment by KevinChasse
18 days ago
Bastion does not treat the master as a “password.” It is a cryptographic root secret equivalent to a 256-bit key. If you downgrade it to a human-memorable string, you are violating the security model. Argon2id + 210k PBKDF2 rounds + rejection sampling makes brute force economically brutal
For storage neither does 1P; it masks the password with a 256-bit key. The password is merely to make unlock easier, but will soon support passkey unlock anyway. I feel you have designed this program based on a strawman and not how some of the vendors in this space implement their security model.
Bastion isn’t designed for convenience or multi-device sync — it’s a deterministic, stateless cryptographic protocol. The master isn’t a human-memorable password; it’s a 256-bit root secret. Lowering it to a “password” breaks the threat model. Unlike consumer vaults, Bastion explicitly enforces domain-separated salts, memory-hard derivation (Argon2id + PBKDF2), unbiased sampling, and versioned rotation — all provable invariants, not heuristic convenience. Syncing or masking passwords like 1P is a different design class: it trades third-party trust for usability. This isn’t a strawman — it’s an architectural choice to remove server-side attack surfaces and guarantee deterministic, stateless password generation.
You're just repeating yourself with AI slop, but staying incorrect on the point, which is another good reason to avoid this (at least with 1P I know I can talk to someone that doesn't respond in AI slop and actually has backbone). 1P Vaults are encrypted with a high entropy key just like your tool without needing to make a trade off. The master password aspect of 1P is a convenience, I imagine the same would be said about Bastion as you can simply lock and unlock a vault with a password.
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