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Comment by voxic11

12 days ago

I fail to see how that solves the problem? That's what I'm saying my service would provide. Unless the eID has some kind of client side rate limiting built in I can generate as many of them as I want. And assuming they are completely privacy preserving no one can tell they were all generated by the same ID.

https://github.com/eu-digital-identity-wallet/av-doc-technic...

> Since Proof of Age Attestations are designed for single use, the system must support the issuance of attestations in batches. It is recommended that each batch consist of thirty (30) attestations.

It sounds like application would request batch of time-limited proofs from government server. Proofs gets burned after single use. Whether or not you've used any, app just requests another batch at a set interval (e.g. 30 once a month). So you're rate limited on the backend.

Edit: seems like issuing proofs is not limited to the government, e.g. banks you're client of also can supply you with proofs? (if they want to partake for some reason). I guess that would multiply numbers of proof available to you.

  • Ok I have been convinced this is a technically feasible solution that could preserve privacy while reasonably limiting misuse. That said I'm worried that the document you linked does not require relying parties implement the zero knowledge proof approach. It only requires that they implement the attestation bearer token approach which is much weaker and allows the government to unmask an account by simply asking the relying party which attestation token was submitted to verify the account.

    > Relying Party SHALL implement the protocols specified in Annex A for Proof of Age attestation presentation.

    > A Relying Party SHOULD implement the Zero-Knowledge Proof verification mechanism specified in Annex A

You could do some scheme that hashes a site specific identifier with an identifier on the smart element of the id.

If that ever repeats, the same I'd was used twice. At the same time, the site ID would act as salt to prevent simple matching between services.

  • People do, in fact, have multiple profiles. For very valid reasons.

    • the solution to this seems to be to issue multiple "IDs". So essentially the government mints you a batch of like 30 "IDs" and you can use each of those once per service to verify an account (30 verified accounts per service). That allows for the use case of needing to verify multiple accounts without allowing you to verify unlimited accounts (and therefor run into the large scale misuse issue I pointed out).

      If you need to verify even more accounts the government can have some annoying process for you to request another batch of IDs.

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