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Comment by ramon156

8 days ago

Does anyone have a good grasp of the differences between GOS and /e/OS? I'm buying a Fairphone soon and was wondering what both are like

GrapheneOS claims to be a lot more secure, having additional hardening. See https://eylenburg.github.io/android_comparison.htm - keep in mind that it is not an independent comparison, the Graphene guys directly feed what this table is supposed to say in the issue tracker, https://github.com/eylenburg/eylenburg.github.io/issues/. But it gives a good representation of the state of the ROMs according to Graphene.

In regular use, main difference will be that /e/OS comes with access to the alternative cloud service that project provides. It uses the default FOSS solution microG for google api compatibility, unlike GrapheneOS with their sandbox approach. /e/OS sets on AppLounge to install and upgrade both play store or F-Droid apps. Graphene has a small curated app repo instead.

I'd never use GrapheneOS since I don't trust the project. /e/OS is also not my favorite since it feels like it is developing slowly, having had issues with outdated software versions - though it does work well in practice. Have a look at iode for an alternative.

  • > I'd never use GrapheneOS since I don't trust the project

    Fair enough, you choose what you trust.

    But personally, I have never seen a technical claim from GrapheneOS that was wrong or misleading. But I have seen many claims from /e/OS that were technically wrong or misleading. So I trust GrapheneOS more.

    Then there is the drama, and all sides annoy me when they behave like this. But I have seen drama coming from all sides.

    • I have never seen drama from /e/ or any other project GrapheneOS attacks, like Calyx. Please link me to it - I asked this several times, people never can follow up. So far?

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  • > GrapheneOS claims to be a lot more secure

    That's not just a claim, this is an objective fact. GrapheneOS has a excellent track record when it comes to security, they have made several patches that got upstreamed to Android, etc.

  • > GrapheneOS claims to be a lot more secure, having additional hardening.

    GrapheneOS has been heavily analyzed by privacy and security experts who say it provides far better privacy and security. There's a large amount of real world evidence showing GrapheneOS very successfully defends against commercial exploits tools. /e/ has been heavily criticized for having poor privacy and atrocious security by many experts. /e/ doesn't keep up with basic privacy/security patches and misses many important standard protections.

    > keep in mind that it is not an independent comparison

    That's not true. It's an independent comparison and the site compares a lot of other software. Contributors to many of the projects compared by it submit issues to it which doesn't many it not an independent comparison.

    > In regular use, main difference will be that /e/OS comes with access to the alternative cloud service that project provides.

    GrapheneOS users have many cloud services available including suites from Proton and others. Murena services have poor privacy and security overall due to neglecting server security, updates and more. Their speech-to-text service being a thin wrapper around OpenAI sending this sensitive user data to them rather than doing it locally as our SpeechServices app does similarly to Apple (even Google has that as an option):

    https://community.e.foundation/t/voice-to-text-feature-using...

    > It uses the default FOSS solution microG for google api compatibility

    Their approach with microG gives highly privileged access to Google apps/services by default. GrapheneOS doesn't include sandboxed Google Play by default and they're installed as regular apps. microG doesn't change the fact that the apps are using closed source Google libraries, which are still present with microG and have strictly more access to user data on /e/ than GrapheneOS with sandboxed Google Play. Sandboxed Google Play is an entirely opt-in feature people need to install. /e/ has microG set up where it downloads closed source Google Play components it runs with privileged access as the default.

    > /e/OS sets on AppLounge to install and upgrade both play store or F-Droid apps

    This is a strange merger of Aurora Store, F-Droid and more. It's very misleading and confusing for users.

    > /e/OS is also not my favorite since it feels like it is developing slowly, having had issues with outdated software versions - though it does work well in practice. Have a look at iode for an alternative.

    Neither /e/ or iodéOS keeps up with updates to Android, Chromium, firmware, drivers or the Linux kernel. Both mislead users with an inaccurate Android security patch level. iodéOS lags far less behind /e/ and doesn't have nearly as many privacy violating services and added privacy/security flaws but neither is a privacy or security hardened OS. Neither keeps the privacy or security of standard AOSP intact.

I have been using /e/OS for 5 years, and also GOS. My take is:

- If your phone is supported by GOS, you should go for GOS.

- If your phone is not supported by GOS, you should look carefully and compare between /e/OS and Stock Android.

I had a Fairphone 3, and after 5 years, /e/OS was outdated by 4 years w.r.t. the manufacturer updates. In other words, Stock Android coming from Fairphone was more secure than /e/OS on that Fairphone.

In my experience, /e/OS has a tendency to claim that they support everything, but they just can't, there is too much. And then they complain when GrapheneOS criticises the fact that some /e/OS users believe their phone is well supported but actually isn't. And GrapheneOS is not wrong: I realised I was in that case after 4 years with /e/OS.

  • > I had a Fairphone 3, and after 5 years, /e/OS was outdated by 4 years w.r.t. the manufacturer updates

    Mine is running /e/ and reporting Android 13, which appears to be the last one Fairphone support. /e/ said it was too difficult to support 14 with the kernel involved. It's had continual security updates apart from the Android version.

    Edit: Murena make it clear which phones are officially supported and which have "community" support.

    • > Mine is running /e/ and reporting Android 13, which appears to be the last one Fairphone support.

      This is not the manufacturer updates. I was talking about the manufacturer updates. I just checked and someone complained a few months ago and they updated them. Before that, they had not been updated in years on /e/OS, but they were up-to-date on Stock Android.

      > Edit: Murena make it clear which phones are officially supported and which have "community" support.

      I bought a phone to Murena, advertised by Murena, through Murena. It really felt like it would be officially supported, otherwise they should have made it clear that they advertise and sell something that they won't support, wouldn't you say? My feeling is that they just stopped supporting it after a while.

      Also I would assume that "supported" means that it receives both the LineageOS updates and the manufacturer updates. Apparently they have a different definition of "supported" (which is fine, maybe it's just "we will continue sending you our own updates"). It's just that in my book, if I get more security updates with the Stock Android than with /e/OS, then Stock Android is more secure.

    • > It's had continual security updates apart from the Android version.

      Nope, it doesn't receive most privacy and security patches. Users are being heavily misled about what's provided. First of all, the kernel is nearly entirely not being updated which is a massive portion of the privacy and security patches. Murena's devices have poor privacy and atrocious security including due to the failure to properly provide basic privacy/security patches. Their claims about what they provide need to be distinguished from what is actually provided. /e/ updates the patch level regularly to claim they provide the security patch backports but that doesn't mean they actually provided all of them. It's an arbitrary value and they don't set it accurately.

      Fairphone 3 uses the end-of-life Linux 4.9 branch, Fairphone 4 use the end-of-life Linux 4.19 branch and Fairphone 5 uses the end-of-life 5.4 branch. Each was largely not receiving the upstream LTS updates while they were still provided but now they're not provided. An OS that's not receiving basic kernel updates is definitely not receiving security patches anymore, but they were largely never providing these updates in the first place long before the kernel branch or devices were considered end-of-life.

      Similar to iOS and other operating systems, Android only backports a subset of privacy and security patches to older Android branches. Only Android 16 QPR2 has the full set of Android privacy and security patches. You aren't receiving all of the standard Android privacy and security patches if you're not on Android 16 QPR2. Many of the patches are also treated as optional and deferred as being mandatory far into the future. It's also worth noting the dates are misleading. Android's March 2026 security backported have been finalized for a while and up to August 2026 are available to ship by OEMs already but a lot more will be added to June 2026. February 2026 Android security patches are the latest with a public bulletin but not the latest available to ship.

      Fairphone and especially /e/ also have very incomplete patches for firmware and drivers. /e/ also has major issues patching other components including the browser engine used by the OS for the WebView.

  • > If your phone is not supported by GOS, you should look carefully and compare between /e/OS and Stock Android.

    If you have an iPhone that's still supported, you have strong privacy and security. If you have a phone that's not an iPhone and not supported by GrapheneOS then you likely have a phone with atrocious privacy and security regardless of OS choice. If people can afford to get a secure device with years of proper support remaining then they should do that rather than using an insecure device with a sidegrade for privacy and security using a problematic AOSP fork. LineageOS is far less problematic than /e/. If people want to switch the OS to something else due to the OEM abandoning it or to avoid Google Mobile Services they should use at least use LineageOS which is less of a privacy and security downgrade from OS. LineageOS does not fully maintain the privacy and security of AOSP or fully keep up with updates but it's a lot less bad than /e/. Most alternate OSes are forks of LineageOS to reuse their work on hardware support and nearly entirely make privacy and security worse, not better, so why not use the upstream project instead?

    > I had a Fairphone 3, and after 5 years, /e/OS was outdated by 4 years w.r.t. the manufacturer updates. In other words, Stock Android coming from Fairphone was more secure than /e/OS on that Fairphone.

    It's important to note that an alternate OS depends on the OEM for firmware and in practice much more than that including kernel and driver updates. It's theoretically possible to replace the kernel and drivers with much different ones but it's not done in practice by alternate AOSP-based operating systems. If the device is abandoned by the OEM then you aren't going to have a secure device.

    /e/ lags far behind on standard privacy and security updates everywhere but misleads users with an inaccurate Android security patch level along with many inaccurate privacy and security claims. LineageOS is much better than the fork of it by /e/ and does much less to mislead users, although it still has the inaccurate Android security patch level and many people still wrongly believe they're getting patches they aren't after the OEM dropped support.

    • In what ways does LineageOS trail behind AOSP in terms of security? I looked at the comparison chart you linked elsewhere and the privacy/security sections only seem to list advantages over OEM Android (not AOSP), with the exception of secure boot [1], but AOSP (not OEM Android) doesn't have that out-of-the-box either. Unless you are comparing Lineage with OEM Android?

      [1] https://eylenburg.github.io/android_comparison.htm

    • > many people still wrongly believe they're getting patches they aren't after the OEM dropped support.

      I can confirm that I did, and was not very happy when I realised it.

The main difference is that GrapheneOS prioritizes security hardening first and foremost (above usability or compatibility). /e/OS focuses on privacy (i.e. reducing data leakage to adtech) and usability over security.

To put it concretely, GrapheneOS recommends running all the proprietary Google apps in a locked "sandbox" so they can't read data on the phone outside the sandbox -- but obviously Google still gets to see everything you do in their apps. /e/OS tries to provide [largely but not entirely FLOSS] alternatives (e.g. their own Maps app, their own email, their own calendar) that make your phone usable out of the box without Google software.

  • > /e/OS focuses on privacy (i.e. reducing data leakage to adtech)

    /e/OS literally sends STT data straight to OpenAI...

    /e/OS uses priviliged MicroG, which connects to Google for some of its functionality

    /e/OS doesn't keep up with updates properly, making its security suffer, making yoru phone easier to compromise, increasing the likelihood of amongs other things sandbox escabes which open up possibilities to data leakage.

    > GrapheneOS recommends running all the proprietary Google apps in a locked "sandbox"

    They don't recommend this. The user can choose to do so.

    > but obviously Google still gets to see everything you do in their apps

    Indeed, obviously. So, obviously, also the case on any other OS.

    > e/OS tries to provide [largely but not entirely FLOSS] alternatives (e.g. their own Maps app, their own email, their own calendar) that make your phone usable out of the box without Google software.

    You can install apps you need on GrapheneOS providing those alternatives yourself. Android has a large FOSS app eecosystem.

    Much of the things /e/OS bundles for services are just using Nextcloud and their services have been very unreliable in the past, making people unable to access their data for months. Also, Nextcloud isn't end to end encrypted.

    GrapheneOS also makes their own apps, like Vanadium, PDF viewer and Secure Camera.

  • > but obviously Google still gets to see everything you do in their apps

    Well, the actually scary part of google services is that they have this quasi-elevated access in your phone where it can do a lot of stuff ordinary android services just can't do. E.g. google maps' location sharing works this way (but don't quote me on that).

    GrapheneOS managed to "put it back into the bottle", and it runs as a regular android service anyone could write, with the same rules applying. So you have much more control on what you allow it, and this will also limit what data apps relying on google services can leak about you.

  • > security hardening first and foremost (above usability or compatibility).

    Right. Something that GrapheneOS boosters often fail to mention. It's not like those guys at Google are just idiots and don't know how to make a hardened allocator. Android uses a different hardened allocator that is much, much faster and uses less space. GrapheneOS is slower and uses more memory.

    • I assume this is all technically correct, but in practice I've not noticed any speed difference between stock Pixel and GrapheneOS. Maybe their Vanadium browser when tab switching, that feels slow, but I wasn't planning on being part of the Chromium monoculture anyway so this doesn't matter to me

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GOS creates a complete bunker of a phone that can provide defense against pretty much all but the most dedicated state level actors. If you're worried that someone would steal your phone specifically to target you, Graphene will protect against that. Securitywise it's hard to argue against them, although GOS tends to sacrifice usability in favor of security, which leads to odd decisions. Their device depreciation timeline is also pretty aggressive and really just matches that of the Pixel. (You're also buying the Google phone... to not want Google in your life; this bizarre paradox will always be strange). It's not exactly a recommendation for long-term support. Worth noting however is that usage of GOS is also seen as a signal in and of itself for the authorities that you may have something unsavory to hide, so using it stands out in that regard; some law enforcement officers (I think it was in Spain?) have said that the OS is popular with organized crime. GOS obviously denies the connection and they're probably honest in that the OS isn't deliberately designed for criminals, but it's worth noting at the very least. (Basically GOS is the paradox where someone trying their hardest to be anonymous ends up standing out way too much from the crowd and drawing attention to themselves.)

/e/OS (and similar "non-LineageOS" ROMs really) instead focus more on de-Googling. They're still generally security focused, but the priority is less "someone's after you" and more "corporate surveillance is kinda scary innit". The aim is less to avoid someone actively trying to drain your phone of data and more to prevent your phone from passively sending everything it can possibly find to the Big G's ad machine (as well as whatever other trackers get snuck into apps.) Because of this, they usually have better depreciation timelines and support a lot more devices compared to GOS who only support the Pixel line (which is an increasingly awful set of phones truth be told); their scope is much smaller.

Finally, it's worth noting that the GOS community is absurdly toxic to anyone doing anything privacy-related that isn't under the banner of GOS. It's extremely maximalist, tends to get very upset at other projects whenever they get attention (see sibling reply to this, where they pretty much melted down because an outlet dared to recommend a Fair phone+/e/OS) and the projects official channels have generally encouraged this sort of behavior. It doesn't really damage the software itself, but it's worth considering.

  • I have been a user of /e/OS for 5 years, and also of GOS and would like to share my opinion on this:

    > it's worth noting that the GOS community is absurdly toxic to anyone doing anything privacy-related that isn't under the banner of GOS

    What I have seen (and I am not involved in any of those projects) is that GOS does care a lot about security, has a higher quality in that regard than anything else, and tends to be blunt about "inferior" projects communicating about security.

    Not that they couldn't improve their communication style, but usually when they call out technical limitations of other projects (e.g. /e/OS), they are right. And I mean the technical arguments. Then I have seen a bunch of drama, but to be fair I have seen those other communities show toxic behaviour towards GOS just as much as the opposite.

    It feels like it is GOS vs "the others", because the others don't criticise each other, and GOS bluntly criticises when they see claims they find are wrong (I have seen claims by /e/OS going from misleading to downright wrong).

    On my particular phone, after 5 years with /e/OS, the Fairphone updates were outdated by 4 years. In terms of security I would have been better with the Stock Android. It depends on the phone of course, because /e/OS tends to claim that they support everything and they just can't. Even on a phone that /e/OS supports well, GrapheneOS is superior, period.

    But I agree, I could do without all the drama. I guess my point is that it goes both ways.

    • I'm also not involved with any mobile privacy/security project, unless OpenStreetMap data and self-hosting can be said to be such

      > GOS does care a lot about security, has a higher quality in that regard than anything else, and tends to be blunt about "inferior" projects communicating about security.

      Two remarks:

      - There's a difference between "blunt" and hostile or misleading. GOS (owners) are often the latter two from what I read, where by misleading I mean distorting reality about whom you should be protecting from and recommending you should never use anything else to reach your goals (as opposed to GOS' goals)

      - They also reply when privacy comes up in other projects, not just security, but they treat it as though it's essential for privacy. Not everyone is running from an intelligence agency or cellebrite border checkpoints, some people just want a phone with as many open components as possible or want to lie to Facebook about which contacts are on their device. You don't need a locked bootloader and be prevented from accessing your own data for that (can't access /data on your own device on any official GrapheneOS build; which is fine if that's what you want, but not everyone's goals are the same)

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    • /e/OS/ was bad with updates for a long time (I had to switch 2022). IodéOS is very good at it, in my experience (I have used all three)

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    • I guess on /e/OS you can just run Google Maps in a browser if you really want Google Maps features (like searching for a restaurant). Organicmaps works fine if you just need to get from A to B. It does lack live traffic, but you'll have to live with fewer features if you really want to not use Google for most stuff.

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    • The founder and CEO of /e/ and Murena openly spreads content from Kiwi Farms and neo-nazi sites. He directly engages in harassment towards the GrapheneOS team. Here's him supporting authoritarians smearing GrapheneOS by replying to threads about it linking to harassment content based on fabrications on a neo-nazi conspiracy site:

      https://archive.is/SWXPJ https://archive.is/n4yTO

      The communities of several projects including /e/ have heavily engaged in spreading misinformation about GrapheneOS including fabricated stories about our team. They've even taken it to the point of repeated swatting attacks aimed at killing our team members. There are relentless raids on the GrapheneOS community platforms including our chat rooms where Child Sex Abuse Material, gore and endless harassment towards our team members including fabricated stories and harassment content from Kiwi Farms and elsewhere is posted.

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  • > /e/OS (and similar "non-LineageOS" ROMs really)

    LineageOS is degoogled unless you install google apps as a deliberate choice, so I don't really see any advantage or /e/OS or Murena over it.

  • It's a misconception that GrapheneOS is focused on security over everything else. It's a privacy project and privacy depends on security so it heavily focuses on both. It also provides major privacy improvements on a technical level rather than only avoiding privacy invasive apps and services. Privacy involves a lot more than which apps and services are bundled with the OS, contrary to how most supposedly private phone options are marketed.

    > Securitywise it's hard to argue against them, although GOS tends to sacrifice usability in favor of security, which leads to odd decisions.

    GrapheneOS doesn't make any major usability sacrifices for security. Privacy or security features with usability compromises are either opt-in or opt-out.

    > Worth noting however is that usage of GOS is also seen as a signal in and of itself for the authorities that you may have something unsavory to hide

    GrapheneOS is far more widely used than most alternate mobile operating systems and there's a lack of basis to claim that it's widely seen in the way you're describing in a way that other operating systems are not. In fact, they're largely conflating other operating systems with GrapheneOS because it's the most widely talked about and known about. They're calling devices GrapheneOS devices which aren't running it. In many cases it's not even a fork of it.

    > have said that the OS is popular with organized crime

    This is completely unsubstantiated and not evidence has ever been provided. On the other hand, it's known that law enforcement in Europe has widely sold devices to organized crime which they marketed by claiming they were based on GrapheneOS:

    https://darknetdiaries.com/episode/146/

    Using portions of our code doesn't make something GrapheneOS and marketing is also a different thing than reality. Most of what's claimed to be GrapheneOS in this context is not GrapheneOS but rather trademark infringement by forks or even non-forks.

    > /e/OS (and similar "non-LineageOS" ROMs really) instead focus more on de-Googling.

    Nope, /e/ always connects to multiple Google services regardless of configuration and gives highly privileged access to them. GrapheneOS doesn't connect to Google servers by default and avoids giving privileged access to installed Google apps via our sandboxed Google Play compatibility layer.

    > They're still generally security focused.

    No, that's definitely not the case. /e/ has absolutely atrocious security and fails to provide even basic security patches and protections. This is also part of why it provides poor privacy due to lagging far behind on privacy patches in addition to security patches along with being missing important standard Android privacy and security protections due to being far behind and not having it all set up. /e/ doesn't provide comparable privacy features to GrapheneOS Storage Scopes, Contact Scopes, Sensors toggle and far more not only the security features. /e/ isn't just not a security hardened OS, it's also not a privacy hardened OS. LineageOS has better privacy and security than /e/. AOSP has better privacy and security than LineageOS.

    > Because of this, they usually have better depreciation timelines

    /e/ doesn't provide proper updates for any devices. Many of the devices they support aren't getting driver and firmware updates from them even when they're available. They lag far behind on kernel, Android, Chromium (including WebView) and other updates too. They support many devices without kernel, driver and firmware updates available but they're usually way behind even when they are. /e/ simply doesn't care about providing basic privacy and security so they continue having people buy and use highly non-private and insecure devices lacking basic patches.

    > Finally, it's worth noting that the GOS community is absurdly toxic to anyone doing anything privacy-related that isn't under the banner of GOS. It's extremely maximalist, tends to get very upset at other projects whenever they get attention (see sibling reply to this, where they pretty much melted down because an outlet dared to recommend a Fair phone+/e/OS) and the projects official channels have generally encouraged this sort of behavior. It doesn't really damage the software itself, but it's worth considering.

    No, completely backwards. The massive amount of false marketing, misinformation and harassment engaged in by the /e/ project and community is what's toxic. The founder and CEO of /e/ and Murena openly spreads content from Kiwi Farms and neo-nazi sites. He directly engages in harassment towards the GrapheneOS team. Here's him supporting authoritarians smearing GrapheneOS by replying to threads about it linking to harassment content based on fabrications on a neo-nazi conspiracy site:

    https://archive.is/SWXPJ https://archive.is/n4yTO

    The communities of several projects including /e/ have heavily engaged in spreading misinformation about GrapheneOS including fabricated stories about our team. They've even taken it to the point of repeated swatting attacks aimed at killing our team members. There are relentless raids on the GrapheneOS community platforms including our chat rooms where Child Sex Abuse Material, gore and endless harassment towards our team members including fabricated stories and harassment content from Kiwi Farms and elsewhere is posted.

    People should review https://eylenburg.github.io/android_comparison.htm which is a third party maintained comparison between AOSP-based operating systems which addresses many of the misconceptions you have about how GrapheneOS compares to AOSP, /e/ and other operating systems. You're not at all correct about what's provided by /e/ which fails to keep up with basic updates or provide the standard protections.

    We can provide large amounts of further examples of the founder and CEO of /e/ and Murena participating in this harassment.

    The attacks towards us including your libelous claims about us here are what's absurdly toxic.

    > It's extremely maximalist

    It isn't but rather is very pragmatic and focused on usability, robustness and compatibility alongside the major focus on privacy. The focus on security is to protect privacy because it depends on it.

    • Given I don't disagree with you about GOS being the best on security, I think there's only one thing really worth mentioning:

      > The attacks towards us including your libelous claims about us here are what's absurdly toxic.

      I want to make this clear upfront: I have no connection to /e/, Calyx, DivestOS or whatever other projects you've had issues with over the years. If you've had trouble with them I find that very unfortunate for you, but they are entirely unrelated to this conclusion. I do not consider these claims to be libelous when they're fairly easy to check:

      The reason I consider GOS' community to be extremely toxic and find official channels enabling this is for a few very simple reasons:

      1. I've seen several incidents of GOS users coming into adjacent Android communities to start beef with those communities while giving off the attitude of zealots. For a concrete example, the F-Droid forums have a thread about Googles impending changes to letting users install their own software ( https://web.archive.org/web/20250903081432/https://forum.f-d... ). The original OP for this thread has a pointless attack on the F-Droid project, declaring GOS to be superior. Moderators eventually changed this to be more mild (but it's why the first replies are snarking on low-hanging fruit about GOS), but I've seen similar behavior in other places - there's a reason that a lot of Android communities generally respond with trepidation and annoyance whenever the project is brought up and it's because of this behavior from the userbase.

      2. I can read the GrapheneOS forums; they're public. Nearly every issue I've seen people have with GOS on the forums is effectively met by a "you're holding it wrong". This sets a tone for the community that makes it come across as extremely hostile to potentially interested users.

      3. In the same sense, it's trivial to notice that the official GrapheneOS account on this forum is a frequent participant in these discussions, generally backing up the hostility on the virtue of technical accuracy. This to me suggests endorsement of this attitude. (See a sibling to my initial comment where the official account makes a post on the GOS forums about an unrelated blog for daring to recommend a different ROM/phone combo. This to me is not indicative of healthy communications, but rather of an obsession to promote GrapheneOS at every corner.)

      4. I remember, as a Bromite user, the futzing with the Vanadium license in order to prevent other Android Chromium forks from making use of it's patches for the crime of... considering a contribution from someone the GOS project has beef with. That to me is the most telling thing really. The goal with that license futzing was never to actually help advance privacy/security or anything like that. It was to try and force a different project to conform to GrapheneOS' demands over something extremely minor and GOS went ballistic and threatened license changes (which they eventually did) the moment the maintainer asked for a bit more information because "GOS doesn't like this person" isn't enough to immediately warrant kicking someone off a project. Cromite (the fork of Bromite, as Bromite's maintainer went AWOL) still doesn't include Vanadiums hardening patches because of this. It's fucking absurd.

      4 is the big one for me. It is absolutely unacceptable, unbecoming and to put it plainly: toxic behavior from an official voice in the project. It's fucking rich and borderline hypocritical to talk about GOS' consistent upstreaming of Android hardening patches while making it impossible through a license change for other projects to share it's contributions.

      (Here's a source for that btw; https://github.com/bromite/bromite/issues/2141 and https://github.com/bromite/bromite/pull/2102 for the original incident. csagan5 essentially got jumped with extreme hostility for something they couldn't have been aware of and was very reasonable about, and all they got in response was more threats and hostility.)

Consider this (by Graphene OS): https://discuss.grapheneos.org/d/24134-devices-lacking-stand...

/e/OS community talking about it: https://community.e.foundation/t/article-from-grapheneos-abo...

And then maybe this: https://eylenburg.github.io/android_comparison.htm

Hope that helps.

  • I like GrapheneOS but they fail to understand in this post that the #1 security concern an android user face is the lack of privacy.

    Sure they have hardened everything but realistically, that's not the main threat for your average user.

    Their top contribution to android is the sandboxed Google Play, by far.

    • I think it's more of a marketing claim from less secure systems that "privacy is not security, and GrapheneOS focuses on security while we focus on privacy".

      GrapheneOS does care about both, quite obviously. And GrapheneOS tends to say that if your security is bad, then it is affecting your privacy too. Whereas others say "sure, we break the Android security model by unlocking the bootloader and signing our system with the Google test keys, but your apps will contact Google through microG instead of the Play Services, so it's more private". Which is worth what it is worth...

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    • GrapheneOS is primarily privacy project. It keeps up with important Android updates with major privacy enhancements and very important privacy patches. It builds crucial privacy protections such as Storage Scopes, Contact Scopes, Sensors toggle and much more into the OS. Privacy depends on security so security protections and security patches are part of providing strong privacy too.

      It's a misconception that GrapheneOS is focused on security over privacy. It heavily works on privacy features and the work on security features is entirely to protect privacy. There's widespread use of commercial exploit tools and GrapheneOS is proven to provide far better real world protection against those. Most alternate operating systems reduce privacy from AOSP and massively reduce security while GrapheneOS is preserving the baseline and heavily improving both side by side.

      GrapheneOS is also very focused on usability and app compatibility, making sure to preserve those with the major privacy and security enhancements.

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    • privacy != security.

      And sandboxed Google Play services serve both goals -- it runs the service as a regular android service, not an exceptional one that has a bunch of extra permissions. So you can allow/restrict it as you seem fit, while not "getting behind" on features/apps that mandate it.

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GrapheneOS is a privacy and security hardened OS. It preserves the standard privacy and security of the Android Open Source Project (AOSP) along with keeping up with the updates. It builds major privacy and security improvements on top of that. /e/ is the direct opposite and reduces privacy and especially security compared to AOSP. /e/ doesn't keep up with updates, has huge delays for important privacy and security patches along with reducing privacy and especially security in many other ways. GrapheneOS is a much more widely used OS with much more testing and provides much broader app compatibility. Unlike /e/, GrapheneOS only connects to GrapheneOS services by default and provides a high level of control over it. /e/ still uses a bunch of Google services by default and gives extensive privilege access to Google apps/services. Our approach is that Google apps/services are an optional thing people can install which do not receive any special access and can't do more than other regular apps since they're installed as regular sandboxed apps on GrapheneOS via our Sandboxed Google Play compatibility layer.

A common misconception is that people believe GrapheneOS is less usable than much less private and far less secure options but it's the other way around. GrapheneOS provides nearly perfect app compatibility when taking into account the per-app exploit protection compatibility toggle and sandboxed Google Play. Nearly the only apps not working on GrapheneOS are ones banning any alternate OS and a larger number of those work on GrapheneOS than elsewhere due to a subset specifically permitting GrapheneOS due to far higher rather than weaker security. Apps have legitimate reasons for being concerned about the poor security of many alternate operating systems but they're wrongly grouping it all together as if GrapheneOS.

/e/ lags weeks, months and even years behind on providing updates for drivers, firmware, the Linux kernel and more. They miss a large portion of the monthly Android security bulletins which are a limited subset of the patches in the first place but then claim to provide the latest patch level despite many of the required patches being missing.

/e/ has a supposedly private speech-to-text sends data to OpenAI and their own servers without obtaining explicit user consent to share sensitive data with a third party.

https://community.e.foundation/t/voice-to-text-feature-using...

They say the data is anonymized based on passing it through their own servers before OpenAI but OpenAI is receiving all of the user speech data under their usual terms of service enabling them to store and leverage it.

Fairphone lags significantly behind on OS updates and patches with only a small subset of what should be provided being shipped. Their hardware omits important security protections required by GrapheneOS which it uses to protect users against widespread commercial exploit tools. Fairphone doesn't provide upstream Linux kernel updates in practice which is a massive omission for their updates. Fairphone 4 has an end-of-life 4.19 kernel branch and the Fairphone 5 despite not being very old already has an end-of-life 5.4 kernel branch. Neither was providing the LTS revisions prior to end-of-life so from their perspective nothing really changed but it means it's a huge task for an alternative OS to provide basic updates since they'd need to port everything to a newer kernel branch.

/e/ does not provide similar privacy features to GrapheneOS such as Contact Scopes, Storage Scopes, Sensors toggle and much more. It focuses on bundling things which can be provided with apps such as RethinkDNS on GrapheneOS with a higher quality implementation. GrapheneOS delegates as much as it can to apps while focused on the core OS. If a feature can be done better with an open source app, we'd rather leave it up to that app and many provide privacy and security protections which apps cannot. For the most part, apps can't improve OS privacy and security. Enumerating badness via blocklists which cannot block anything that's dual purpose functionality is also a very weak approach to privacy which is increasingly less useful. The most privacy invasive behavior of apps is nearly all done through their own services which also provide their functionality. Among other things, /e/ uses this system for labeling app tracking and permissions which is incorrect and misleading as shown by this example:

https://reports.exodus-privacy.eu.org/en/reports/com.faceboo...

Facebook clearly doesn't have no tracking but rather this system only detects a small number of specific third party libraries they've decided are trackers. Those choices are often very questionable such as portraying even opt-in crash reporting as tracking because it used a third party library on their list. Meanwhile, Facebook's lite app supposedly has no trackers. The permissions list is thoroughly inaccurate and not how Android permissions work. The core permissions are opt-in with apps having to request them so listing those as if they're granted on install and mandatory due to being possible to grant is incorrect. Most of the rest have special access toggles which are opt-in for the sensitive ones or other toggles such as the battery optimization mode where Restricted stops apps starting themselves and delays those things until it's run by another app or the user.

Privacy requires providing privacy patches and strong privacy protections. It also depends on security which means providing security patches and strong security protections. GrapheneOS is heavily focused on all of that rather than simply treating not having bundled Google apps and services as meaning a private OS. There are also worse things for privacy than Google apps and services. /e/ sending speech data to OpenAI vs. Apple doing the processing locally as we've it implemented for GrapheneOS is a good example. Google at least has partial local speech-to-text support and a better privacy policy than OpenAI for the cloud portion. Avoiding Google apps/services is not the same thing as providing strong privacy.