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Comment by cyberax

4 days ago

Ah, the next step towards True DANE!

We then can just staple the Persist DNS key to the certificate itself.

And then we just need to cut out the middleman and add a new IETF standard for browsers to directly validate the certificates, as long as they confirm the DNS response using DNSSEC.

This decreases the salience of DANE/DNSSEC by taking DNS queries off the per-issuance critical path. Attackers targeting multitenant platforms get only a small number of bites at the apple in this model.

  • DNS queries are still part of the critical path, as let's encrypt needs to check that the username is still allowed to receive a cert before each issuance.

  • Sure. It's yet another advantage of doing True DANE. But it still requires DNS to be reliable for the certificate issuance to work, there's no way around it.

    So why not cut out the middleman?

    (And the answer right now is "legacy compatibility")