Comment by microtonal

I have phones with both, but I don't necessarily agree that /e/OS is easier. E.g. things like doing or restoring in-app purchases often do not work, even when logging in through microG. Want that nice backup option that Signal is now offering? Well, good luck, you cannot purchase it on /e/OS (at least I couldn't). In general when it comes to compatibility, my experience is that GrapheneOS is better because it can use real Google Play Services, albeit sandboxed. I think you can use the Play Store on /e/OS as well, but it's going to have higher privileges.

No data sent to Google by default

Not true. /e/OS does send data to Google by default: https://www.kuketz-blog.de/e-datenschutzfreundlich-bedeutet-...

They also use Google for assisted GPS when you use it, eSIM provisioning, widevine provisioning. Last time I checked, microG on /e/OS also downloads a Google binary blob for SafetyNet.

Besides analytics, if you install Google Apps (e.g. for Android Auto), many of them get higher privileges on /e/OS.

The price to pay is:

I would also add installing F-Droid apps (if you use App Lounge) through 'CleanAPK', without wanting to reveal why this is necessary or who owns/maintains CleanAPK.

They do quite a lot of fishy stuff. It may be incompetence, but yeah...

If your main concern is protecting against state actors attacks or very specific threats

This always sounds like systems like GrapheneOS are for paranoid people. But this is basically you if you ever go to a demonstration (e.g. in the US) or cross borders of certain countries (e.g. of the US), sadly things like Cellebrite have become very common. Then suddenly layered protection, not running years behind in security patches, a duress pin, or rebooting after not unlocking for a few minutes to get back to BFU aren't so bad. (IANAL, figure out yourself which of these are legal and not destruction of evidence.)