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Comment by tialaramex

10 hours ago

This actually reminds me of the "God of the gaps" problem. A gradual retreat in the face of inconvenient facts.

Many years ago when I was a student the argument was that integrity isn't a big deal so plaintext telnet is just fine. If you're paranoid you use an "enhanced" telnet where the authentication step is protected but not everything else [Yes I'm an old man]

By the turn of the century everybody agreed telnet is stupid, use SSH but integrity still wasn't a big deal when it comes to ordinary web sites. Only your bank needs SSL fool.

And I suppose that 8-10 years ago that changed too and it's now recognised that plaintext HTTP really isn't good enough, you need HTTPS. But still I see that you say integrity isn't important when it comes to DNS records.

Integrity is the hardest thing to get ordinary users to care about. Given how freely even young kids lie we should probably take it more seriously but it remains hard to get ordinary people to care, however ultimately this does matter.

Sir, this is a Wendy's. We're talking about ECH. Can you maybe rephrase all this to be specifically about how DNS record integrity practically impacts the threat model for ECH? The threat actor for Encrypted Client Hello is ISPs.

This same thing happened with DNS cache corruption; which went unaddressed from the mid-1990s to 2008 despite the known fix of port/ID randomization because the DNS operator community was fixated on the "real" fix of... DNS record integrity.