Comment by INTPenis
20 hours ago
I started treating long random bucketnames as secrets years ago. Ever since I noticed hackers were discovering buckets online with secrets and healthcare info.
This is where IaC shines.
20 hours ago
I started treating long random bucketnames as secrets years ago. Ever since I noticed hackers were discovering buckets online with secrets and healthcare info.
This is where IaC shines.
~As far as I know, bucket names are public via certificate transparency logs.~ There are tools for collecting those names. Besides you'd leak the subdomain to (typically) unencrypted DNS when you do a lookup and maybe via SNI.
Edit: crossout incorrect info
I'm pretty sure buckets use star certs and thus the individual bucket names won't be in the transparency logs.
Ah you're right, they are always wildcard certs. I think I was mis-remembering https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=15826906, which guesses names based on CT logs.
In either case, the subdomain you use in DNS requests are not private. Attackers can collect those from passive DNS logs or in other ways.
> Besides you'd leak the subdomain to (typically) unencrypted DNS when you do a lookup and maybe via SNI.
"Leak" is maybe a bit over-exaggerated, although if someone MitM'd you they definitely be able to see it. But "leak" makes it seem like it's broadcasted somehow, which obviously it isn't.
No man-in-the-middle is needed, DNS queries are often collected into large datasets which can be analyzed by threat hunters or attackers. Check out passive DNS https://www.spamhaus.com/resource-center/what-is-passive-dns...
You'd need to check the privacy policy of your DNS provider to know if they share the data with anyone else. I've commonly seen source IP address consider as PII, but not the content of the query. Cloudflare's DNS, for example, shares queries with APNIC for research purposes. https://developers.cloudflare.com/1.1.1.1/privacy/public-dns... Other providers share much more broadly.
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I just started using hashes for names. The deployment tooling knows the "real" name. The actual deployment hash registers a salt+hash of that name to produce a pseudo-random string name.
This is all good and we'll on the IaC side,yes. But at the end of the day, buckets are also user facing resources, and nobody likes random directory / bucket names.
That's a contradiction, a bucket name being treated as a secret in IaC, while being a user facing resource. So no, they're not user facing resources.
If anyone wants them to be user facing resources, then treat them as such, and ensure they're secure, and don't store sensitive info on them. Otherwise, put a service infront of them, and have the user go through it.
The S3 protocol was meant to make the lives of programmers easier, not end users.
It would be nice if the other end of this could be addressed: a configurable policy to limit resolution of bucket names within an account namespace. Ideally, if someone doesn’t have permission to resolve a bucket name, they shouldn’t even be able to detect whether it exists.