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Comment by huhtenberg

7 hours ago

> Plenty of setups block incoming SYN,!ACK packets

Even in the presence of a conntrack entry created by an earlier outbound SYN,!ACK ?

Got a source?

I've seen plenty of firewall rulesets over the past 25 years which only consult state after doing some initial stateless inspection.

I don't have a convenient source though.

  • Sanity checks, sure, but SYN,!ACK packets cannot be rejected before the conntrack for obvious reasons.

    > Plenty of setups block incoming SYN,!ACK packets

    Nowhere close to being "plenty". It's doable, but this is extremely niche.

    • It's not uncommon with routable internal networks to only drop inbound SYN,!ACK to disallow inbound connections while permitting outbound ones, since it doesn't require connection tracking (which can be resource intensive).

      I can't really imagine why you would do it for NAT'd v4 since you can't avoid the connection tracking overhead, but you certainly could, and I don't doubt OP has run into it in the wild. I've seen much weirder firewall rules :)

    • for obvious reasons

      What are the obvious reasons? If you're protecting a client system, you don't want to allow in any bare SYNs. (And for that matter, if you're protecting a server, you probably want to discard ill-targeted bare SYNs without consulting conntrack anyway, just as a matter of avoiding extra CPU work.)

    • Does this mean by establishing a new connection with a SYN,ACK bypasses some firewalls? I expect at least one OS out there ignores the extraneous ACK flag and proceeds to establish a new connection.

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