Comment by staticassertion
6 days ago
> I don't know why I am still perpetually shocked that the default assumption is that humans are somehow unique.
Because, empirically, we have numerous unique and differentiable qualities, obviously. Plenty of time goes into understanding this, we have a young but rigorous field of neuroscience and cognitive science.
Unless you mean "fundamentally unique" in some way that would persist - like "nothing could ever do what humans do".
> People constantly make comments like "well it's just trying a bunch of stuff until something works" and it seems that they do not pause for a moment to consider whether or not that also applies to humans.
I frankly doubt it applies to either system.
I'm a functionalist so I obviously believe that everything a human brain does is physical and could be replicated using some other material that can exhibit the necessary functions. But that does not mean that I have to think that the appearance of intelligence always is intelligence, or that an LLM/ Agent is doing what humans do.
>But that does not mean that I have to think that the appearance of intelligence always is intelligence, or that an LLM/ Agent is doing what humans do.
You can think whatever you want, but an untestable distinction is an imaginary one.
First of all, that's not true. Not every position has to be empirically justified. I can reason about a position in all sorts of ways without testing. Here's an obvious example that requires no test at all:
1. Functional properties seem to arise from structural properties
2. Brains and LLMs have radically different structural properties
3. Two constructs with radically, fundamentally different structural properties are less likely to have identical functional properties
Therefor, my confidence in the belief that brains and LLMs should have identical functional properties is lowered by some amount, perhaps even just ever so slightly.
Not something I feel like fleshing out or defending, just an example of how I could reason about a position without testing it.
Second, I never said it wasn't testable.
Your reasoning may lower your confidence, but until it connects to observable differences, it is still at least partly a story you are telling yourself.
More importantly, the question is not whether LLMs work the same way human brains do. You may care about that, but many people do not. The relevant question is whether they exhibit the functional properties we care about. Saying “they are structurally different, therefore not really intelligent” is a lot like insisting planes are not really flying because they do not flap like birds.
And on your last point: in practice, it is not testable. There is no decisive intelligence test that sorts all humans into one bucket and all LLMs into another. So if your distinction cannot be cashed out behaviorally, functionally, or empirically, then it starts to look less like a serious difference and more like a metaphysical preference.
No, but it does mean that you should know we don't understand what intelligence is, and that maybe LLMs are actually intelligent and humans have the appearance of intelligence, for all we know.
You're just defining intelligence as "undefined", which okay, now anything is anything. What is the point of that?
Indeed, there's quite a lot of work that's been done on what these terms mean. The fields of neuroscience and cognitive science have contributed a lot to the area, and obviously there are major areas of philosophy that discuss how we should frame the conversation or seek to answer questions.
We have more than enough, trivially, to say that human intelligence is distinct, so long as we take on basic assertions like "intelligence is related to brain structures" since we know a lot about brain structures.
Our intelligence is related to brain structures, not all intelligence. You can't get to things like "what all intelligence, in general, is" from "what our intelligence is" any more than you can say that all food must necessarily be meat because sausages exist.
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