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Comment by darkamaul

19 hours ago

I’m maybe not understanding here, but isn’t it the point of release attestations (to authenticate that the release was produced by the authors)?

[0] https://docs.github.com/en/actions/how-tos/secure-your-work/...

The problem is nobody checks.

All the axios releases had attestations except for the compromised one. npm installed it anyway.

  • Yes, that's why I aim to make the checks transparant to the user. You only need to provide the download url for the authentication to take place. I really need to record a small demo of it.

Artifact attestation are indeed another solution based on https://www.sigstore.dev/ . I still think Asfaload is a good alternative, making different choices than sigstore:

- Asfaload is accountless(keys are identity) while sigstore relies on openid connect[1], which will tie most user to a mega corp

- Asfaload ' backend is a public git, making it easily auditable

- Asfaload will be easy to self host, meaning you can easily deploy it internally

- Asfaload is multisig, meaning event if GitHub account is breached, malevolent artifacts can be detected

- validating a download is transparant to the user, which only requires the download url, contrary to sigstore [2]

So Asfaload is not the only solution, but I think it has some unique characteristics that make it worth evaluating.

1:https://docs.sigstore.dev/about/security/

2: https://docs.sigstore.dev/cosign/verifying/verify/