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Comment by InfinityByTen

7 hours ago

When I see someone just throwing a lot of numbers and graphs at me, I see that there are in to win an argument, and not propose an idea.

Of late, I've come across a lot of ideas from Rory Sutherland and my conclusion from listening to his ideas is that there are some people, who're obsessed with numbers, because to them it's a way to find certainty and win arguments. He calls them "Finance People" (him being a Marketing one). Here's an example

"Finance people don’t really want to make the company money over time. They just thrive on certainty and predictability. They try to make the world resemble their fantasy of perfect certainty, perfect quantification, perfect measurement.

Here’s the problem. A cost is really quantifiable and really visible. And if you cut a cost, it delivers predictable gains almost instantaneously."

> Choosing to spend three weeks on a feature that serves 2% of users is a €60,000 decision.

I'd really want to hire the Oracle of a PM/ Analyst that can give me that 2% accurately even 75% of the time, and promise nothing non-linear can come from an exercise.

As with any attempt to become more precise (see software estimation, eg. Mythical Man Month), we've long argued that we are doing it for the side effects (like breaking problems down into smaller, incremental steps).

So when you know that you are spending €60k to directly benefit small number of your users, and understand that this potentially increases your maintenance burden with up to 10 customer issues a quarter requiring 1 bug fix a month, you will want to make sure you are extracting at least equal value in specified gains, and a lot more in unspecified gains (eg. the fact that this serves your 2% of customers might mean that you'll open up to a market where this was a critical need and suddenly you grow by 25% with 22% [27/125] of your users making use of it).

You can plan for some of this, but ultimately when measuring, a lot of it will be throwing things at the wall to see what sticks according to some half-defined version of "success".

But really you conquer a market by having a deep understanding of a particular problem space, a grand vision of how to solve it, and then actually executing on both. Usually, it needs to be a problem you feel yourself to address it best!

None of his math really checks out. Building a piece of software is or at least was orders of magnitudes more expensive than maintaining it. But how much money it can make is potentially unbounded (until it gets replaced).

So investing e.g. 10 million this year to build a product that produces maybe 2 million ARR will have armortized after 5 years if you can reduce engineering spend to zero. You can also use the same crew to build another product instead and repeat that process over and over again. That's why an engineering team is an asset.

It's also a gamble, if you invest 10 million this year and the product doesn't produce any revenue you lost the bet. You can decide to either bet again or lay everyone off.

It is incredibly hard or maybe even impossible to predict if a product or feature will be successful in driving revenue. So all his math is kinda pointless.

  • The longer software is sold the more you need to maintain it. In year one most of the cost is making it. Over time other costs start to add up.

  • > Building a piece of software is or at least was orders of magnitudes more expensive than maintaining it

    This feels ludicrously backwards to me, and also contrary to what I've always seen as established wisdom - that most programming is maintenance. (Type `most programming is maintenance` into Google to find page after page of people advancing this thesis.) I suspect we have different ideas of what constitutes "maintenance".

    • I like the good ol' "80% of the work in a software project happens before you ship. The other 80% is maintaining what you shipped."

As with most things, isn't the truth somewhere in the middle? True cost/value is very hard to calculate, but we could all benefit by trying a bit harder to get closer to it.

It's all too common to frame the tension as binary: bean counters vs pampered artistes. I've seen it many times and it doesn't lead anywhere useful.

  • Here I think the truth is pretty far to one side. Most engineering teams work at a level of abstraction where revenue attribution is too vague and approximate to produce meaningful numbers. The company shipped 10 major features last quarter and ARR went up $1m across 4 new contracts using all of them; what is the dollar value of Feature #7? Well, each team is going to internally attribute the entire new revenue to themselves, and I don’t know what any other answer could possibly look like.

    • Even if you could do attribution correctly (I think you can do this partially if you are really diligent about A/B testing), that is still only one input to the equation. The other fact worth considering is the scale factor - if a team develops a widget which has some ARR value today, that same widget has a future ARR value that scales with more product adoption - no additional capital required to capture more marginal value. How do you quantify this? Because it is hard and recursive (knowing how valuable a feature will be in the future means knowing how many users you have in the future which depends on how valuable your features are as well as 100 other factors), we just factor this out and don't attempt to quantify things in dollars and euros.

You’re illustrating one of the points of TFA - a team that is equipped with the right tools to measure feature usage (or reliably correlate it to overall userbase growth, or retention) and hold that against sane guardrail metrics (product and technical) is going to outperform the team that relies on a wizardly individual PM or analyst over the long term making promises over the wall to engineering.

  • Feature usage can't tell you that.

    There's often a checklist of features management has, and meeting that list gets you in the door, but the features often never get used