Comment by progval

Opus 4.7 it if you can't wait

Have you got any info about this. 'seinfo -c' shows there is an alg_socket class. I presume this permission is required to be able to create an AF_ALG socket:

    $ sesearch -A -c alg_socket -p createallow bluetooth_t bluetooth_t:alg_socket { accept append bind connect create getattr getopt ioctl listen lock read setattr setopt shutdown write };
    allow container_device_plugin_init_t container_device_plugin_init_t:alg_socket { accept append bind connect create getattr getopt ioctl lock map read setattr setopt shutdown write };
    allow container_device_plugin_t container_device_plugin_t:alg_socket { accept append bind connect create getattr getopt ioctl lock map read setattr setopt shutdown write };
    allow container_device_t container_device_t:alg_socket { accept append bind connect create getattr getopt ioctl lock map read setattr setopt shutdown write };
    allow container_engine_t container_engine_t:alg_socket { accept append bind connect create getattr getopt ioctl lock map read setattr setopt shutdown write };
    allow container_init_t container_init_t:alg_socket { accept append bind connect create getattr getopt ioctl lock map read setattr setopt shutdown write };
    allow container_kvm_t container_kvm_t:alg_socket { accept append bind connect create getattr getopt ioctl lock map read setattr setopt shutdown write };
    allow container_logreader_t container_logreader_t:alg_socket { accept append bind connect create getattr getopt ioctl lock map read setattr setopt shutdown write };
    allow container_logwriter_t container_logwriter_t:alg_socket { accept append bind connect create getattr getopt ioctl lock map read setattr setopt shutdown write };
    allow container_t container_t:alg_socket { accept append bind connect create getattr getopt ioctl lock map read setattr setopt shutdown write };
    allow container_userns_t container_userns_t:alg_socket { accept append bind connect create getattr getopt ioctl lock map read setattr setopt shutdown write };
    allow openshift_app_t openshift_app_t:alg_socket { append bind connect create getattr getopt ioctl lock read setattr setopt shutdown write };
    allow openshift_t openshift_t:alg_socket { append bind connect create getattr getopt ioctl lock read setattr setopt shutdown write };
    allow spc_t unlabeled_t:alg_socket { append bind connect create getattr getopt ioctl lock read setattr setopt shutdown write };
    allow staff_t staff_t:alg_socket { append bind connect create getopt ioctl lock read setattr setopt shutdown write };
    allow sysadm_t sysadm_t:alg_socket { accept append bind connect create getopt ioctl listen lock read setattr setopt shutdown write };
    allow unconfined_domain_type domain:alg_socket { accept append bind connect create getattr getopt ioctl listen lock map name_bind read recv_msg recvfrom relabelfrom relabelto send_msg sendto setattr setopt shutdown write };
    allow user_t user_t:alg_socket { append bind connect create getopt ioctl lock read setattr setopt shutdown write };

... that's a lot of domains, including container_t and user_t; and obviously anything unconfined_t can't be expected to be restricted.

(Maybe you & others are specifically thinking of Android's policy?)

The underlying exploit allows writing arbitrary values to the page cache, independent of any namespacing, so it should be assumed to allow container escapes even if the given PoC code doesn't do that.