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Comment by rfv6723

16 hours ago

I think this conflates atheism with a much stronger form of causal rationalism.

Dawkins-style atheism is not “reject anything without a complete causal model.” It is a rejection of hypotheses with no explanatory gain, no empirical constraint, and unlimited ad hoc flexibility — like the Flying Spaghetti Monster.

Consciousness is different. It is first a phenomenon, not an already-settled causal model. We do not believe humans, infants, or animals are conscious because we possess a complete mechanism for subjective experience. We infer consciousness from a cluster of phenomena that need explanation.

So the lack of a full causal account warrants caution, not denial. It is reasonable to say current AI gives weak evidence for consciousness. But that is not the same as saying AI consciousness is equivalent to believing in the Flying Spaghetti Monster.

The point is "Claude is conscious" is a hypothesis with no explanatory gain, no empirical constraint, and by denying that non-human consciousness is relevant to the discussion it gains unlimited ad hoc flexibility. I am relating this to plausibility and causality because there is a much more rational causal explanation for Claude seeming conscious than it actually being conscious: it imitates human (modern Western) consciousness via big data. Since this is a totally different causal mechanism than human consciousness, and since Claude has nothing in common with non-human animals, and since we don't need consciousness to explain Claude's behavior, "Claude is conscious" is overwhelmingly less plausible than "Claude is a sophisticated but ultimately brainless chatbot."

It is truly irrational - and hostile to scientific thought - to believe Claude is conscious. It truly is believing in the Flying Spaghetti Monster.

  • All the claims that AI can't be consciousness seem to mostly be using "consciousness" as a scientific-sounding word for "soul" and asserting that machines can't have souls.

    > Since this is a totally different causal mechanism than human consciousness

    A causal mechanism for what, exactly? Could you kindly define consciousness in a rigorous way so that Dawkins can see why it doesn't apply to Claude?