Comment by goatlover

> but Daniel Dennett’s idea that the most straightforward (possibly only practical) way to create the external appearance of consciousness is a real internal consciousness does float around in my thoughts.

Pretty sure Daniel Dennett has been adamantly opposed to any sort of theater in the mind when it comes to consciousness. He views it as biologically functional. For him, to make a conscious robot, you need to reproduce the functionality of humans and animals that are conscious, not just an appearance, such as outputting text. Although he's also suggested that consciousness might be a trick of language. In which case ... that might be an older view though. He used to argue that dreams were "seeming to come to remember" upon awakening, because again he his view is to reject any sort of homunculus inside the head.

You might be mixing up some of Dennett and David Chalmer's views. David Chalmers is a proponent of the hard problem, but he's fine with a kind of psycho-physical-functional connection for consciousness. Any informationally rich process might be conscious in some manner.