Comment by slopinthebag
9 hours ago
I feel like it might be strengthened by a machine that actually does implement the core of the argument (even passes the turing test?) but is also just matrix multiplication. Previously the idea of a device that could respond to input with human-like output was a fantasy, now it's reality which removes one of the arguments against the Chinese Room on the basis of plausibility.
But yes, I would like to see a modern philosophers take on it.
I'm more interested in whether the uninformed intuitions have changed, whether someone who used an LLM before graduating from school and entering university has a more forgiving stance than an "ignorant" college entrant from ten years ago. From my experience of the field, I would really doubt many philosophers of mind have changed their view based on this. The major questions of interest concern qualia, it ha been so for many years.
Plausibility was never an argument against Searle's Chinese Room Argument ... that's a very deep confusion, since Searle was arguing against the possibility of Strong AI, whereas advocates of Strong AI of course thought it was plausible and that's why they were working to create it. That you conflate the Chinese Room Argument with "the Chinese Room" is one aspect of the confusion.
It’s absolutely about the plausibility of mechanistic intentionality, given the implausibility of intentionality where the person in the experiment doesn’t understand chinese
Searle's argument may well be about the plausibility of "mechanistic intentionalty", whatever exactly that means ("mechanistic" just sounds like bigotry to me ... we are all mechanisms and Searle didn't say otherwise, just that we are meat mechanisms and not purely syntactic mechanisms ... and his argument was intended as a logical proof, not just a plausibility argument), but that's not what the previous comments were about. Apparently you mechanistically see the word "plausibility" and think that any and all statements about it refer to the same thing.
I won't respond further.