Comment by cedws
4 days ago
What’s the selling point of ODoH given the low uptake of ECH which means the name of the server you’re talking to is given away anyway?
4 days ago
What’s the selling point of ODoH given the low uptake of ECH which means the name of the server you’re talking to is given away anyway?
It means you can use a decently fast DNS server like Cloudflare without the major privacy problems of using Cloudflare. Or DNS4EU, or any non-ISP DNS server really.
Your ISP snooping on you with SNI logging is something people using normal ISPs don't need to worry about, but feeding all your data into a profit-driven company is.
> something people using normal ISPs don't need to worry about
It doesn't matter which ISP you're using if the cables are tapped, which they pretty much are.
If you piss off any government enough that you suspect your wires may be tapped, ODoH will not save you and TOR probably will not do much better.
If you live in a place with omnipresent government monitoring (China/Iran/etc.), there is no solution. Any solution to getting wiretapped with a legal order will almost certainly be an extra charge the day you do get arrested.
Please don’t be intentionally tone-deaf. “a nation-state can track my shit therefore it’s not with doing” is a silly, silly, silly approach to security, and does not speak to the concerns of the vast majority of even privacy-focused people.
2 replies →
My, admittedly cynical, view of it is that the main selling point is that you share your data with the person running the ODoH server.
The truth is that very very few people run their own recursive nameserver. The entirely reasonable assumption for any authoritative nameserver, like .com, is that the query is being asked on behalf of someone else and knowing that a user of your nameserver asked for the ip of sexysheep.com doesn't give them a lot of useful info.
I'm think many ISPs actually sell a lot of data from their recursive nameservers, but I'm willing to bet that almost no-one bothers to sniff port 53 udp traffic going elsewhere.
My vote for the best privacy option is always going to be just run pi-hole with your own recursive nameservers.
The relay sees IP + ciphertext, the target sees question + relay's IP. No single party gets both
What if the relay and target are being operated by the same provider? The relay controls where the question is sent right? They can collude?
3 replies →
> your own recursive nameserver
But then the internet can know that you are the one using your own resolvers and so they can trivially identify your traffic.
Really you need to use some public resolver with a critical mass of other users in order to have any hope for anonymity. But then of course you have to trust that resolver too.
I'm disappointed that sexysheep.com is just a domain parking page. I'm not sure what I was hoping for, but I think that's the worst possible outcome.
What's the selling point of locking your front door given that you have an easily breakable window nearby?
It's more like closing the blinds while your frontdoor is wide open.
By that logic, someone else would ask "what's the point of ECH since that data will just leak via DNS?" and then neither technology would ever roll out. Deploying this now despite that is exactly how you fix that chicken-and-egg problem.
I'd think that if you've got several leaks then patching one up is still forward progress even if it doesn't deliver a full fix immediately.
They solve different things. ODoH hides your question, not who you're talking to.
Sure ODoH hides your query but you then turn around and leak the question you just asked as part of the TLS handshake.
Leaked to different parties.
Assuming you don't have ECH, you leak the question (in practical terms) to your ISP, and you leak your question to the DNS provider. With ODoH you plug the latter leak. Plugging that first leak is then still a problem (solved separately) but it's orthogonal to the second.
Even with ECH, where you plug the TLS leak, you have many more holes to plug. IP address might not be shared or might be shared across too few properties, and then traffic profile after the initial connect (to retrieve all the sub-resources) can identify destinations.
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I agree with you, however that's a separate problem that needs to be solved
ODoH selling point is same as DoH selling point: third party DNS providers, e.g., shared caches, want query data for commercial purposes^1
And, funnily enough, they want data from users who are looking for "privacy"
Also, ODoH claims it will hide the client's IP address. ECH, even it were adopted by CDNs and websites, cf. being "supported" by a browser,^2 will not hide the client's IP address
1. Silicon Valley has this bizarre narrative where ISPs are the "bad guys" when it's Silicon Valley who created the online surveillance dystopia we are living in. Truthfully it's a competition over who can collect more data, conduct more surveillance and perform more ad services: Silicon Valley or ISPs. Silicon Valley is generally 100% focused on this as a "business model", cf. selling internet access, they have captured the market and they pose a much greater threat to the user seeking "privacy"
2. Where the browser vendor is Silicon Valley and data collection, surveillance and online advertising services is the "business model"
NB. Third party recursive DNS service has other uses besides "privacy", e.g., avoiding censorship