No, because I don't keep a list of every article I've read over the past decade or so, but there were multiple busts where a regular law enforcement agency (FBI and their international counterparts) were able to prove the identity of a user simply by timing attacks.
The fact that Tor does not intend to tackle the timing problem is plainly stated on the Tor website.
Sort of. There are a bunch of timing attacks bug in general it still works fairly well.
Also, a buch of conspiring entry-/exit-nodes will do the trick, if you have a budget for enough of them.
It has been successfully deanonymized, and resistance to NSA-level capabilities is explicitly not a stated goal.
Do you have a source for this?
No, because I don't keep a list of every article I've read over the past decade or so, but there were multiple busts where a regular law enforcement agency (FBI and their international counterparts) were able to prove the identity of a user simply by timing attacks.
The fact that Tor does not intend to tackle the timing problem is plainly stated on the Tor website.
and so is ARPANET