Been a passive reader here at HN for too long, finally registered today. Instead of viewing this incident objectively, you choose to insult me (?).
I know multiple startup founders personally (2 of them are in the current YC batch), and the sheer callousness with which they look at infra, especially from security/scalability/reliability angle is shocking.
I'll personally reserve judgement against GCP (replace with AWS/Azure/OCI/whatever) until we know more.
Then let me be the not day-one account to say Railway is utterly bearing some responsibility here.
"However, in this ring, there was still a hard dependency on workload discoverability being tied to the network control plane API that was hosted on the machines running in Google Cloud."
They've gotta be joking me that they deliberately left something so critical under the control of any other entity than themselves. That demonstrates a lack of critical planning and a lack looking at their configuration from a first-principles approach.
There is always responsibility with Railway, that's given. But also taking into account how many big websites went down when AWS was down, building critical redundancy at such large scale is not cheap, and not many companies do it. Same as security theatre, we have redundancy theatre because they needed to sell the CLOUD.
Been a passive reader here at HN for too long, finally registered today. Instead of viewing this incident objectively, you choose to insult me (?).
I know multiple startup founders personally (2 of them are in the current YC batch), and the sheer callousness with which they look at infra, especially from security/scalability/reliability angle is shocking.
I'll personally reserve judgement against GCP (replace with AWS/Azure/OCI/whatever) until we know more.
Then let me be the not day-one account to say Railway is utterly bearing some responsibility here.
"However, in this ring, there was still a hard dependency on workload discoverability being tied to the network control plane API that was hosted on the machines running in Google Cloud."
They've gotta be joking me that they deliberately left something so critical under the control of any other entity than themselves. That demonstrates a lack of critical planning and a lack looking at their configuration from a first-principles approach.
There is always responsibility with Railway, that's given. But also taking into account how many big websites went down when AWS was down, building critical redundancy at such large scale is not cheap, and not many companies do it. Same as security theatre, we have redundancy theatre because they needed to sell the CLOUD.