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Comment by sega_sai

4 hours ago

I simply don't understand why leveraged buy-out(LBO) is allowed in the first place. It is like paying for the company with the money from the company you are buying.

It provides liquidity to business owners.

As a business owner, if you want cash today because you are done with a business. You could go to a bank and get a loan to pay dividends. This is a bad deal for the bank as you have no incentive to operate the business after you cash out the loan. A private equity firm comes in and operates the business on the model that they still keep some of the profits after the loan value.

The crappy side comes in as a customer, the PE firm can do this to an arbitrary number of firms in the area and raise prices on each/cut services. PE firms can trivially build out monopolies. Many of these monopolies will be invisible as they leave the existing branding etc. in place.

  • That in itself is reasonable. However governments choose to encourage it with tax systems that mean you pay less tax by increasing debt. This is the main thing that breaks capital structure irrelevance: https://moneyterms.co.uk/capital-structure-irrelevance/

    > As a business owner, if you want cash today because you are done with a business. You could go to a bank and get a loan to pay dividends.

    If you are a business owner you could borrow yourself using the business as security.

    • but then you would need to keep running it, what if you don't want to do that anymore? how do you incentivize someone to keep it going to pay off the debt you just borrowed outside of the llc.

Private parties are allowed to make bad business decisions: Lenders can give loans that might not pay back. Businesses can take on a lot of debt and cash out the owners if allowed under the terms of the loan. A PE buyout isn’t even necessary to do this. The owners could load the company up with debt and pay themselves a lot of money if they negotiated the right loan terms. One of the suppliers I used for a while did exactly this, enriching the owner and then collapsing.

One correction is that it’s not like paying for the company with money from the company you’re buying, because that obviously wouldn’t benefit the sellers. The money comes from a lender and they get terms to take the business if the loan terms aren’t meant. The lenders are the effective new largest owners of the company with the PE firm being a smaller owner but the expected primary operator.

You understand mortgages, though, right?

Even 3% or 0% down mortgages?

  • LBO's are like buying a rental property where the mortgage is approved based on expected future rental income from the property.

    That's why the parent is saying "It is like paying for the company with the money from the company you are buying.".

    • LBOs are much worse than that. It's like buying a rental property where the mortgage is owed by the a shell corporation that owns the property. The shell corporation, not the purchaser, owes the debt.

      It's like taking out a mortgage on a house, but letting the house owe the debt.

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    • That's exactly HOW rental properties are (supposed to) be bought!

      Most small-time single family landlords actually go above and beyond that and "pretend" the rental is a house they're buying to live in (or actually is, for a time) and get a "home owner's mortgage" which is even easier.

      Large commercial real estate is sold and loaned based on future rental income, pretty formulaically.

  • Yes, those exist in industrialized countries as a result of public policy decisions. We do not have 3 or 0% mortgages because that’s what the market naturally bears or produces: we have it because mortgage debt is backstopped by the state.

    It’s possible to “understand” mortgages by understanding that conditions for stable home markets don’t arise by themselves—we collectively make them possible because the outcome is desired—then wonder WTF because what social function is creating conditions for private equity getting us.

    • In residential real estate, I think stems in large part from a desire to help people who don’t come from money to own personal real estate (which is one of the best ways to go from $0 or negative net worth to positive six figure net worth).

      Not only is that politically attractive, I think it’s more good than bad as public policy.

      Turning back to PE/LBOs:

      Having limited liability entities (companies) also serves good public purposes. Having companies being able to borrow money also does. Having companies being able to own other companies also does. I think that’s the only three ingredients you need for the PE model to operate and I don’t think that the public is helped by barring any of those three things.

This was called corporate raiding in the 1980s and even Reagan era America looked upon the practice as horrific, vilifying it in books/movies. That it's now an acceptable norm even after 40 years of it making things worse says a lot about the state of our nation. 'Money above all else' is more believed today than 1980s Reagan America.

It is analogous to a mortgage, you put down X% and the house itself secures the loan, along with PMI if your equity is below 20%. The assets of the business secure the loans in the same way a house secures a mortgage.

  • It is not analogous because if you sell your house and the sale money is not enough to cover your mortgage you are still on the hook for what's left of the principal. A leveraged buyout is exclusively on the purchased company's books, so if the company goes to zero the PE parent company is not on the hook for a single penny.

    • That varies by state. Twelve states are fully non-recourse states (lenders can’t go after borrowers beyond the loan security); in other states they may be able to, but borrowers who default on their mortgage may not be particularly asset-rich targets in the first place.

      If the company wasn’t able to borrow money for itself, a wrapper company could which would still have very closely the same effect as being an asset-poor borrower.

    • What I don't understand is how the cost of banks repossessing these companies in case of default don't make the math unviable. Unless the company have a lot of fairly stable semi-liquid assets (like real estate) banks should be charging fairly high interest on these loans which would make most of these business unprofitable.

      Which would increase the rate of defaults (if they are authorized in the first place) and in turn increase interest even further. I guess the PE is always maxxing out the leverage on every deal at _just_ the projected break-even point for loan repayment? But that leaves no room for error or changing market conditions which also increase the rate of defaults and so on.

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    • Yes, it's using bankruptcy and limited liability to extract value from companies that may well be completely solvent and functional with little/no downside or risk to PE.

      Pure parasitism.

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    • Yes, this is the crucial distinction. (I wish that articles criticizing PE were framed in terms of LBOs + bankruptcy-law instead, because that's the root of the policy problem.) Corporations can go bankrupt without risk to the human beings who are owners/investors in the corporation.

      Note that from the lender's perspective, the risk is the same and in a perfect-information universe could be mitigated by charging higher interest. The problem for society is the externality that the business's services get worse.

    • > so if the company goes to zero the PE parent company is not on the hook for a single penny.

      Sounds like a problem for whoever is providing the financing. Not really my concern unless you're saying there's some systemic problem it causes like with mortgage securitization during 2007. The lender will charge a high interest rate if what you're saying is true.

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    • Not necessarily. In non-recourse states like California, the lender is stuck if the asset becomes worth less than the loan.