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Comment by rayiner

2 days ago

[flagged]

The author, Joe Mullin, is a policy analyst:

<https://www.eff.org/about/staff/joe-mullin>.

He's been working in that capacity with the EFF since at least 2018: <https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/02/ipr-process-saves-80-c...>.

Your further objections are ... facile.

  • It suppose I can see "executive power should be part of the executive branch" as a facile argument because it does seem basic and a bit tautological, but it is still quite a strong point. It needs to be addressed rather than just identified and dismissed.

    • It is, and I've admitted as much in a subsequent response (<https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=48517524>). It was however poorly articulated and muddied by some irrelevant distractions.

      I'm working on a top-level comment on that point as I write this, given that this particular subthread is dead and thus invisible to most visitors to HN. My response highlights what seem to me salient points about other instances of violation of separation of powers, and of the history of the copyright office.

No surprise that you'd show up to shill for it.Your argument boils down to 'if it looks like an executive branch agency, then the Executive branch should have control over it' rather than accepting that Congress is free to set things up as it sees fit within the Constitutional constraints.

  • > accepting that Congress is free to set things up as it sees fit within the Constitutional constraints.

    The unitary-executive crowd worships a golden calf, namely the first three words of Article 2: "The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America."

    One could argue that the "executive Power" is whatever the Congress says it is. Suppose that a future Congress were to decide that the president is to be, basically, the butler for the federal government — think Mr. Carson on Downton Abbey, in charge of the household staff but still very much a servant himself — with of course the other specifically-enumerated presidential powers (read: duties) in the remainder of Article 2. It's hard to say in advance that such a hypothetical congressional action would be categorically inconsistent with the Framers' intentions.

  • "Shilling" would require me to care about the policy, which I don't. The genius of the founders is that they realized that structure and power allocation was more important than policy, so that's what I'm commenting about.

    On that point, Congress cannot "set things up as it sees fit." The constitution goes to great lengths to create a complex, three-branch system of government with specific powers allocated to each branch. Anytime Congress creates something new, it has to fit it into the three-branch model in a way that is consistent with the principles of that model. It's like a "pure" microkernel in computer science: there is a framework that dictates what goes in kernel space versus user space. Except with the constitution, the structural principles are legally binding. You can't delegate executive functions to mere employees of the legislative branch, just like in a pure microkernel you can't put the GUI into the kernel.

    In this case, the DMCA creates civil and criminal liability. Creating exceptions for that is the exercise of a quintessential executive power--enforcement discretion. That power must be allocated to an executive-branch agency.

    • I specifically said 'within the Constitutional constraints.' For some reason you chose to ignore that and then launch into a superfluous lecture on the Constitution. You are pounding the table, counselor.

  • Hypothetically, if Congress passed legislation saying "it looks like an executive branch agency, the Executive branch should have control over it" you'd consider that a generally reasonable position all else equal?

    If you concede that it looks like an executive agency then it actually seems quite proper that the executive control it.

    • No. Congress can set up and modify different parts of the executive branch, but can also set up wholly independent agencies that are not parts of the executive branch. The current administration often argues (through legal filings or proxies) that such agencies are somehow illegitimate and the executive branch should have authority over everything. That idea isn't peculiar to this administration, they just seem to have gone all-in on 'unitary executive theory' because it provides arguments for consolidating as much power as possible in the office of the Presidency.

      2 replies →

    • youd also have to consider that the executive branch isn't allowed to make decisions, so the copyright office couldnt actually do anything, unless congress specifically passed a law saying a certain work has or does not have copyright protections, and which specific protections.

      no more major questions doctrine

I don't think you've at all addressed why moving anything there towards the executive is desirable, especially given the capriciousness of the current executive.

FYI: though EFF articles have individual named authors, they go through an extensive collective editing process. Every post will have had at least one domain-specific lawyer reviewer who signs off on it.

That is a rather narrow definition of checks and balances. The term can be applied to any group of organizations where each organization has power and interest to limit the power of the others.

  • The article is talking about a bill that restructures a body in the U.S. federal government. In that context, “checks and balances” has a specific, well-known meaning. It’s like writing an article about Fedora 42 and using the term “kernel.” In that context, readers expect the term to be used in a specific way.