Well, badbits are only enforced on the centralized http gateways. LibGen CIDs would still resolve fine using the DHT as the decentralised discovery mechanism
I don't know, it looks pretty decentralised to me?
>The purpose of this list is to allow IPFS node operators (e.g. someone running a public IPFS gateway) to opt into not hosting previously flagged content.
IPFS node operators, who are supposedly interested in hosting malicious content (and i2p-hosted phishings are a real problem) can OPT INTO using this list.
In this case, I don't see how that's any problem for piracy - people can just use one of the bad/unfiltered nodes.
It slowly was taking off—e.g. Library Genesis on IPFS[0]—but then IPFS introduced Bad Bits Denylist [1] which killed it on arrival.
[0] https://freeread.org/ipfs.html
[1] https://badbits.dwebops.pub/
Suddenly it looks a lot less decentralised.
Well, badbits are only enforced on the centralized http gateways. LibGen CIDs would still resolve fine using the DHT as the decentralised discovery mechanism
I don't know, it looks pretty decentralised to me?
>The purpose of this list is to allow IPFS node operators (e.g. someone running a public IPFS gateway) to opt into not hosting previously flagged content.
IPFS node operators, who are supposedly interested in hosting malicious content (and i2p-hosted phishings are a real problem) can OPT INTO using this list.
In this case, I don't see how that's any problem for piracy - people can just use one of the bad/unfiltered nodes.
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Also public key lists like what Whatsapp now publishes