Comment by Asraelite
12 hours ago
Backdoors are often (almost always?) designed to look like incompetence so that there's plausible deniability.
12 hours ago
Backdoors are often (almost always?) designed to look like incompetence so that there's plausible deniability.
That sounds like a fun thing to wonder about, but how could anyone possibly know that for sure?
That's what makes it plausible deniability.
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It's refreshing to see someone around here addressing the compulsively overlooked elephant in the room; plausible deniability. I am not implying it applies directly here, but notice the trend -- it's taboo to even speculate on and often gets rebuke for even hinting at it. The social convention around it is perfect cover. And I am not the only one that knows this. If we were to wake suddenly and realize the scale of relevance here, we'd probably all go full luddite. Call me paranoid though.
If this wasn’t Tenda maybe I would be more inclined to agree with you. We are talking about an extremely shitty bargain basement vendor. The three stars on Amazon kind of router company.
I think sufficiently explained by incompetence over malice applies here. Some nefarious three letter agency having a backdoor like this is pretty pointless anyway.
Unless you’ve enabled remote management you can’t even get to this backdoor from a physical network perspective.
And then you change some router settings which really aren’t a magical access point into your devices in your home. My PC isn’t just going to magically allow you to browse the file system just because a malicious actor got on my local network. They can’t intercept anything moving over TLS.
Not saying it’s good to have that kind of access, but I think at the scale of “typical home network of consumer devices” the utility and blast radius is pretty limited. Go ahead and launch a DDOS attack on my printer and use up my ink cartridges, I guess.
Well, as mentioned (but perhaps not with sufficient emphasis), I wasn’t implying that this case is necessarily some 3-letter agency op. However, things eg(*) CopyFail, XZ Utils / Jia Tan, Intel ME/IME, Heartbleed, Dirty COW, CVE‑2021‑3156, third‑party contractors, supply chains, and the myriad opportunities all around, are but a few examples that leave me cynical. I don’t claim detailed, expert understanding for any of these; however, I’m convinced the majority of such things remain unknown, and a that our perceived malice:incompetence ratio is off.
I think we could stop reflexively defaulting to “incompetence” when the end result just as easily resembles a deliberate exploit. Plausible deniability is an extremely effective cover when it’s smartly applied.
I’m not disputing any of your specific technical points; my cynicism is thematic. Even when I try to muzzle it, it tends to get through. The parent comment, though short, is dense with implications about cheap gear, opaque firmware, exposure surfaces I think deserve more sustained attention.
* A quick, generic, maybe sub-ideal list to harden my point.