Comment by jiggawatts
1 day ago
> Because you know that the current one works.
What do you even mean by "works", specifically?
> it might have bugs, you know what they are.
Okay, so it doesn't work, you know it doesn't work, it's just that you accept the specific ways in which it doesn't work.
I've lost track of all the myriad stupid ways in which these ancient systems are hugely ineffectual without even being outright faulty.
Like airline tickets where your name is printed as "LASTFIRSTMR" in all caps and no spaces because their systems are ancient beyond belief.
Similarly, my bank statements are security-critical, because anyone with a copy of my credit card details can pull money out of my account without my express authorization. But...
... because they're stored in terrible ancient mainframe databases, the text fields all have tiny maximum lengths. Hence they're all abbreviations. Attacker-controlled abbreviations without any authenticity assurance of any kind!
I have no idea who actually transfers money out of my accounts! There are no URLs, no metadata, nothing to actually confirm the identity of the other party. Every field in a transaction record is 100% attacker-controlled and unverified by my bank.
If you look at it from the perspective of someone used to modern web security, then you realise that banking is a raging tyre in comparison. Banks literally just accept a certain rate of criminal activity and "price that in", reversing transactions when asked -- which itself can also be a criminal activity. They just shrug their shoulders.
"What can we do about this?" -- says the people that have tried nothing and are all out of ideas.
Rewrite it. The whole thing.
Use an actual database, something made in the last three decades instead of half a century ago.
Use cryptography. No, not crypto coins! I just mean a bog-standard algorithms like public-private key signing so that it is possible to confirm the source of transactions.
Etc.
I would much rather have something generated with the assistance of a modern LLM than what we have now, which is security holes big enough to drive a panamax container ship through.
> What do you even mean by "works", specifically?
It runs and accepts people's payments, which means you're not on the front page of the newspaper (not in a good way).
> ... because they're stored in terrible ancient mainframe databases, the text fields all have tiny maximum lengths. Hence they're all abbreviations. Attacker-controlled abbreviations without any authenticity assurance of any kind!
They also have to go through payment networks which are very often the limits on those things. So yeah, it sucks, but just fixing one DB isn't enough - the whole thing has to get upgraded.
> I have no idea who actually transfers money out of my accounts! There are no URLs, no metadata, nothing to actually confirm the identity of the other party. Every field in a transaction record is 100% attacker-controlled and unverified by my bank.
There is a little bit, but not much. Again, if these transfers are happening via card, it's all a terrible old fixed-length setup. Would be great if it was better, but you need Visa and Mastercard to upgrade as well. And of course there _is_ verification - most banks don't do a great job of surfacing this but they know if they've verified a PIN or CVC, or if it was contactless (in which case it _is_ unverified, but society realised we prefer the convenience there).
> Use cryptography. No, not crypto coins! I just mean a bog-standard algorithms like public-private key signing so that it is possible to confirm the source of transactions.
Obvious question then: You've made a card transaction. It is signed with the other party's private key. What does that buy you? How do you attach trust to this key? Whose is it - the payment gateway or the merchant?
> I would much rather have something generated with the assistance of a modern LLM than what we have now, which is security holes big enough to drive a panamax container ship through.
Sure, and if the LLM can rewrite enough of this system to get what you want, there's heaps of room for improvement. But this is orders of magnitude bigger in scope than rewriting your one old bit of COBOL software, it's systematic.
> It runs and accepts people's payments, which means you're not on the front page of the newspaper (not in a good way).
"It works if nobody attacks it." isn't security.
> They also have to go through payment networks which are very often the limits on those things.
For the same reasons.
> need Visa and Mastercard to upgrade as well.
They won't, and it's not worth asking them to. They're dinosaurs and will simply be replaced by a newer, more agile competitor.
It's already happening! Billions of people in Asia pay with their phones using home-grown payment systems, most of which are generally much more modern and better engineered.
> It is signed with the other party's private key. What does that buy you?
Same as what HTTPS does: attestation of identity by some trusted third-party, to some non-zero level. This could be literally just the existing CA networks and DNS domains as identity, but it could be governments, the banks themselves, etc.
I had some fraudulent transactions on my account labelled "Microsoft Subscription". It wasn't Microsoft. How can I tell?
Not even the bank knew the identity of the third party!
That's insane.