Comment by woodruffw
4 days ago
I don’t think a judge would be impressed by this. If anything it actually makes the legal case easier: there’s a legitimate use for a wiping feature on a phone (e.g. for theft or tampering), but actively producing false information demonstrates an intent to deceive or mislead.
Easier solution: phone wipes itself if passcode is not entered every X hours
GrapheneOS already has an auto-reboot feature that can be set to time intervals ranging from 10 minutes to 72 hours. Rebooting puts the device back in before first unlock (BFU) state. This wipes all memory contents, including the encryption keys. Any unlock attempt will have to go through the secure element, which is basically impossible to tamper with (no successful attacks on the Titan M2 so far, or the Apple SEP for that matter), and includes substantial security mechanisms, such as throttling key derivations (through the Weaver API), or insider attack resistance (requiring user authentication before new firmware can be flashed to the secure element).
Leaked documents from mobile forensics companies, such as Cellebrite or XRY confirm this. It's impossible to crack a Pixel with GrapheneOS in BFU state. See https://grapheneos.social/@GrapheneOS/112462758257739953 and https://grapheneos.social/@GrapheneOS/112826067364945164
Deadmans-switch, nice. I always had a weird fascination for that kind of mechanism, because it inverts the whole situation. Where before you have to actively wipe a phone, now them taking your phone may be the mechanism that triggers the wipe.
Is it legally better? Absolutely. But all they have to do is say "they did this as a legal workaround for that" and you're no better off, at least not without spending the same amount on lawyers. You can't out-tech your way around a corrupt system, they will find a way to get you.
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There's a problem with that too: it would often force the owner of the phone to input the code when outside a secure environment, so a simple video surveillance could obtain the code.
GrapheneOS has a feature to scramble the locations of the numbers on the passcode unlock screen to prevent this exact problem
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Deceiving a kidnapper into thinking you complied with their order to unlock your phone would be a legitimate use.
My RSA app accepts a PIN before it generates a passcode. If I enter the wrong PIN, it’ll generate a wrong passcode.
Do, I guess the cops will continue to beat me until I produce a valid passcode.
This feels like a rhetorical question but I'm not entirely sure. What do you mean?
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